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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION:
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is invoked in
this matter pursuant to Section §78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code
Anotated 1953, as amended.

Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-

3(2) (h) (1953) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ON
APPEAL:
I. Issues:
A. Whether Mr. Lovato should be estopped from attempting to
relitigate the facts of this case before the Utah Court of
Appeals?
Whether the trial court erred when it found that:
B. Mr. Lovato has the ability to pay and should pay alimony
to Ms. Lovato.
C. Mr. Lovato has the ability to pay and should pay the

6

attorney's fees of both parties.
D. In its judgement, Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital
residence should bear an interest rate.
E. Half of the insurance proceeds from a house fire should
be awarded to Ms. Lovato because these insurance proceeds
are a marital asset.
II. Standards of Review:
A. When challenging an allegedly erroneous application of
law to facts, the factual findings themselves must
necessarily be accepted as uncontested.

Sierra Club v. Utah

Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335, 341 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998).
B. "It is well settled that this Court will not disturb the
trial court's distribution of property and award of alimony
in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion is shown/'

Hiqley v. Hiqley, 676 P.2d 379,

382 (Utah 1983)(quoting Dority v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 59
(Utah 1982)).
C. "Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 . . . gives trial courts the
power to award attorney fees in divorce actions. Both the
decision to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees

7

are within the sound discretion of the court/'

Rappleve v.

Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260, 265 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting
Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)).
D. "Determining and assigning values to marital property is
a matter for the trial court, and this Court will not
disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse
of discretion/'

Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263

(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559,
563 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(Morgan II)).
E. "It is well settled that this Court will not disturb the
trial court's distribution of property and award of alimony
in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion is shown/'

Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379,

382 (Utah 1983)(quoting Doritv v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 59
(Utah 1982)).

Furthermore, the trial court's duty to make

an equitable distribution of property in a divorce action
encompasses all assets of every kind; and this includes any
insurance.

Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 949 P.2d

779, 783 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Statement of the Case:

8

Nature of the Case:
This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding.
sued Ms. Lovato for divorce.

Mr. Lovato

The action was tried before

the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring beginning on September 3,
1999.

Judge Nehring entered Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and thereafter issued a Divorce Decree
and its succeeding modification.

In his decision, Judge

Nehring ordered, interalia, the distribution of the Lovatos'
marital property and the award of alimony to Ms. Lovato.
Also included in Judge Nehring's decision was the award of
attorney fees, interest on the equity of the marital home
and one-half of the fire insurance proceeds protecting the
marital home to Ms. Lovato.

Despite Mr. Lovato's claim that

he is disputing Judge Nehring's application of the law to
the facts, in reality Mr. Lovato is attempting to relitigate
the facts of this case before the Utah Court of Appeals.1
Course of the Proceedings:
1. On October 9, 1997, Mr. Lovato filed a divorce action

1

See both a copy of Petitioner's Objections to Proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and to Divorce Decree attached herewith and
subsequent Section of this Brief designated "Course of the
Proceedings."

9

against Ms. Lovato in the Third District Court in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
2. Ms. Lovato answered and counterclaimed on October 30,
1997.
3. An Order for Bifurcation and a Decree of Divorce was
entered on May 4, 1998.2
4. The action was tried before the Honorable Ronald E.
Nehring on September 3, 8, 10 and 30, 1999.3
5. Judge Nehring found for Ms. Lovato on issues regarding
alimony, attorney fees, and interest on the equity of the
marital home and awarded Ms. Lovato one-half of fire
insurance proceeds intended to protect the marital home.4
6. On October 25, 1999, Mr. Lovato filed his Objections to
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and to Divorce
Decree with the trial court.5
7. The Court rejected Mr. Lovato's Objections on November 4,

2

See page 1 of copy of Divorce Decree attached herewith adopted by
the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring after Judge Nehring received
evidence, heard the testimony of the parties and witnesses and
reviewed the exhibits, pleadings and file in these proceedings.
3
See Trial Record.
4
See Judge's Ruling pages 6-9, 10, 6 and 5 respectively.
5

See copy of Petitioner's Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and to Divorce Decree attached herewith.

10

1999.6
8. Mr. Lovato filed a Motion for a New Trial or to Correct
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Divorce Decree
on November 11, 1999.7
9. The Court denied Mr. Lovato's Motion on March 23, 2000.8
10. Mr. Lovato filed a Notice of Appeal and a Cost Bond on
April 18, 2000.9
Disposition at Trial Court:
The Honorable Ronald E. Nehring ruled in favor of Ms. Lovato
on all of the foregoing issues. Judge Nehring ordered Mr.
Lovato to pay alimony to Ms. Lovato.10 Judge Nehring also
ordered Mr. Lovato to pay the attorney's fees of both
parties.11 Judge Nehring next awarded Ms. Lovato a $10,223
judgement against Mr. Lovato in exchange for her equity
interest accrued in the marital residence during the

6

See Minute Entry attached herewith.

7

7 See Petitioner's Motion for New Trial or to Correct Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and to Divorce Decree.
8
9
10

See Minute Entry attached herewith.
See Petitioner's Notice of Appeal.
Id. at pages 9-14. See also copy of Divorce Decree at pages 1013.
11
See copy of Divorce Decree at page 14. See also copy of Amended
Divorce Decree at page 15.
11

parties' marriage.12 Given the following facts, Judge
Nehring ordered that Ms. Lovato's equity in the martial
residence should bear an interest rate and that she is
entitled to recover one-half of fire insurance proceeds
collected by Mr. Lovato from an insurance company after a
fire occurred in the marital property in 1998.13

This Court

should affirm the trial court's rulings on these issues.
Summary of Relevant Facts:
This Appeal Is Another Example Of Mr. Lovato's Abuse Of Ms.
Lovato Which Has Continued Unabated Throughout Their
Divorce:

Mr. Lovato sued Ms. Lovato for divorce in the Third
District Court in Salt Lake County on October 9, 1997.
and Ms. Lovato had been married for thirteen years.
Lovato answered and counterclaimed.

Mr.

Ms.

An Order for

Bifurcation and Decree of Divorce was entered on May 4,
1998, before any valuation of the marital estate was made.
The divorce action was tried before the Honorable Ronald E.
Nehring beginning on September 3, 1999. The following
12

See copy of Divorce Decree at page 9. See also copy of Amended
Divorce Decree at pages 6-7, para 25.
13
See copy of Divorce Decree at pages 9-10. See also copy of
Amended Divorce Decree at pages 7-8.
12

findings of fact and conclusions of law were adopted by the
court after Judge Nehring received evidence, heard the
testimony of the parties and witnesses and reviewed the
exhibits, pleadings and file in these proceedings.
Alimony:
Mr, Lovato was determined to be the primary income earner
throughout the parties' marriage.14

Mr. Lovato was also

determined to have a longer employment history and more
marketable job skills than Ms. Lovato does and, at age
forty-five, to be in the prime income earning stage of his
career.15 Mr. Lovato is employed by the Salt Lake County
Corporation and earns a gross salary of $3,253 per month and
a net salary of $2643.09 per month.16

In addition, Mr.

Lovato regularly supplemented his income during the marriage
through his work at an auto body shop.17

Ms. Lovato, on the

other hand, earns only a net salary of $1,797.71 per month,
after entering the work force full-time for the first time
14

See page 5 of copy of Divorce Decree attached herewith adopted by
the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring after Judge Nehring received
evidence, heard the testimony of the parties and witnesses and
reviewed the exhibits, pleadings and file in these proceedings.

15
16
17

Id. at 11.
See copy of Amended Divorce Decree attached herewith at page 11.
IcL.
13

since the marriage.18

Included in this amount is the family

income Ms. Lovato supplemented through her occasional
operation of a craft booth business.19

Additional facts also

support Judge Nehring's award of alimony to Ms. Lovato.
At the time of trial, Ms. Lovato's living expenses were
determined to be artificially low.20

She had been living

with family members and friends because of Mr. Lovato's
refusal to pay temporary alimony throughout the pendency of
this action.21 As a result, Ms. Lovato's visitation with her
children suffered.22

For these and other reasons, the court

found that Mr. Lovato has more flexibility than Ms. Lovato
does with which to reduce expenses.23
Judge Nehring ordered an offset of the reciprocal
payments owed by both of the parties to each other based on
the facts of the case.

Ms. Lovato has continued to pay

child support to Mr. Lovato throughout the pendency of this
action and has no arrearage due.24

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id^
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.

Mr. Lovato, on the other

at 10.
at 9-10.
at 11. See also copy of Divorce Decree at page 12.
copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 11.
See also copy of Divorce Decree at page 12.
at 3.
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hand, refused to pay any temporary alimony during the
pendency of this action and has filed for bankruptcy.25

Mr.

Lovato was deemed responsible for the assumption of the
parties' marital debts and financial obligations.26

However,

assumption of this financial responsibility was intended to
be in lieu of additional spousal support and, thus, nondischargeable in bankruptcy.27

Furthermore, the court

specifically found that Mr. Lovato's obligation to assist in
Ms. Lovato's support took precedence over Mr. Lovato's
obligation to his creditors in bankruptcy because Mr. Lovato
would not currently be in possession of the marital
residence and additional marital property had it not been
for Ms. Lovato's efforts during the marriage.28

For these

reasons, an offset was ordered.29
Attorney's Fees:
Judge Nehring also ordered Mr. Lovato to pay the attorney's
fees of both parties because of the specific facts of this

25
26
27

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. See also copy of Appellant's Explanation of his Bankruptcy
Discharge in a Chapter 7 Case, Form B18 page 2, attached herewith.
28
See Amended Divorce Decree at page 13.
29
Id. at 13-14.

15

case.

This action has been made unnecessarily lengthy and

time consuming because of Mr. Lovato's actions.30

Mr. Lovato

has consistently refused all of Ms. Lovato's settlement
offers and ongoing efforts to resolve this action.
Furthermore, the court specifically found that Mr. Lovato is
in a better financial position than Ms. Lovato to pay the
attorney's fees incurred as a result of this drawn-out
action.
Equity and Fire Insurance Proceeds From the Marital
Residence:
Judge Nehring also awarded Ms. Lovato a $15,000 judgement
against Mr. Lovato in exchange for her equity interest
accrued in the marital residence during the parties'
marriage.31

"Respondent should be awarded judgement against

Petitioner in the amount of $15,000 . . ."32

If Mr. Lovato

was able to satisfy Ms. Lovato's judgement interest within
thirty days after trial, Mr. Lovato would then have been

30

See copy of Divorce Decree at page 14. See also Appellant's Brief
at page 29. See also "Course of the Proceedings" Section of
Appellee's Brief at pages 5-6.
31
See copy of Divorce Decree at page 9.
32
Id. This amount was later readjusted to $10,223.00, although this
amount still represents 50% of the equity in the marital home. See
copy of Amended Divorce Decree at pages 6-7, para 25.
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awarded sole ownership of the property.33

In addition, Ms.

Lovato was acknowledged to be entitled to recoup one-half of
fire insurance proceeds collected by Mr. Lovato from an
insurance company after a fire occurred in the marital
residence in 1998.34

These insurance proceeds were

determined to be a marital asset, but Mr. Lovato testified
at trial that he had spent most of this money on his own
personal living expenses.35 Given the foregoing facts, Judge
Nehring ordered that Ms. Lovato's equity in the martial
residence should bear an interest rate and that she is
entitled to recover one-half of these fire insurance
proceeds.36
Summary of the Argument:
Mr. Lovato should be estopped from attempting to relitigate
the facts of this case before the Utah Court of Appeals.
When challenging an allegedly erroneous application of law
to facts, the factual findings themselves must necessarily

33
34
35
36

Id^
Id. at 10.
See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 7.
See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at pages 7-8.
17

be accepted as uncontested.37

Mr. Lovato claims to be

contesting the trial court's application of the law to the
facts.38

However, a review of Mr. Lovato's brief reveals

that his legal arguments are, in reality, a guise for
factual disputes. Furthermore, Mr. Lovato's legal arguments
fail to identify error by the trial court or to provide any
meaningful legal analysis.39 Therefore, Mr. Lovato's legal
challenge should be rejected in its entirety.
Mr. Lovato's legal arguments lack merit. The evidence
with respect to the award of alimony was voluminous in this
case.40

Mr. Lovato's arguments regarding an offset and

equalizing the standards of living of the parties' are
similarly flawed. The trial court's judgement was correct in
determining that Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital
residence should bear an interest rate and that she is also
entitled to one-half of insurance proceeds from a fire in
the marital home. Finally, since this appeal lacks merit,
37

Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd.. 964 P.2d
335, 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
38
See Appellant's Brief at page 3.
39
See State v. Price, 827 P. 2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). See
also State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (court may
decline to address arguments without merit on appeal).
40
See copy of Divorce Decree at pages 10-13. See also copy of
Amended Divorce Decree at pages 9-14.
18

the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato
should be affirmed and she should be entitled to recover
additional attorney's fees for the costs of this appeal.
Argument:
Mr. Lovato Should Be Estopped From Attempting To Relitigate
The Facts Of This Case Before The Utah Court Of Appeals:

This Court should estop Mr. Lovato from attempting to
relitigate the facts of this case before the Utah Court of
Appeals.

"It is well settled that this Court will not

disturb the trial court's distribution of property and award
of alimony in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown."41

Mr. Lovato

claims to be contesting the trial court's application of the
law to the facts.42 However, a review of Mr. Lovato's brief
reveals that his legal arguments are, in reality, a guise
for factual disputes. For example, much of Mr. Lovato's
brief supplies mathematical "corrections" to the amounts
arrived at by the trial court after receiving evidence from

41

Hialev v.Hialey, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983) (quoting Dority v.
Doritv, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982)).
42
See Appellant Brief at page 3 .

19

the parties.43

Since Mr. Lovato's legal arguments are, in

reality, factual disputes, this Court should estop Mr.
Lovato from further abusing both Ms. Lovato and the judicial
system.
Mr. Lovato's other legal arguments reveal the same fatal
flaw: in actuality, they are factual disputes. Many of Mr.
Lovato's legal arguments can be reduced to a disagreement
with economies of scale.44

Mr. Lovato continues to live in

the marital home with the two teen-aged children.

Ms.

Lovato, on the other hand, must now obtain separate and
suitable housing for herself so that she can be capable of
fulfilling her parental responsibilities.45

Mr. Lovato's

disagreement with economies of scale is a factual dispute
and not a legal argument.
Furthermore, Mr. Lovato's legal argument that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial court's
rulings46 reveals that Mr. Lovato's real disagreement lies

43
44

IdL at 16-18, 21-22, 31.
Id. at page 13, final para, page 14, first para, and page 22, n.7,
all comparing the living expenses of the parties.
45
See copy of Divorce Decree at page 12. See also copy of Amended
Divorce Decree at page 11.
46
See Appellant's Brief at pages 10, 28, and 29.
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not with the trial court, but with the evidence itself. For
example, despite the specific factual findings made by the
trial court to the contrary, Mr. Lovato continues to argue
that he lacks the ability to pay alimony.47

Further, Mr.

Lovato persists in arguing the amount of his transportation
expenses, despite the trial court's specific finding that
Mr. Lovato could reduce his transportation expenses.48

Mr.

Lovato also continues to argue the amount of tax that should
be deducted from his income, despite the trial court's
specific accounting of the amount of tax that should
properly be deducted from Mr. Lovato's income.49

In a

nutshell, Mr. Lovato's legal arguments fail to identify
error by the trial court or to provide any meaningful
factual or legal analysis.50
fallen far

Therefore, Mr. Lovato has

short of his burden to show a clear and

prejudicial abuse of discretion.
47

Compare Appellant's Brief at page 11 with copy of Divorce Decree
at pages 10 and 11. See also copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page
11, para 41.
48
Compare Appellant's Brief at page 12 with copy of Amended Divorce
Decree at page 12, para 44.
49
Compare Appellant's Brief at page 17 with copy of Amended Divorce
Decree at page 11, para 42.
50
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). See also
State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (court may decline to
address arguments without merit on appeal).
21

Finally, since Mr. Lovato's legal arguments make evident
his bad faith, this Court should reject Mr. Lovato's
appellate brief in its entirety. For example, Mr. Lovato
incorrectly characterizes the trial court's award of alimony
to Ms. Lovato as the trial court's legal conclusion that
funds are available from child support as a source of
payment for alimony.51

Mr. Lovato has propounded this

argument to this Court despite the fact that Judge Nehring
specifically clarified to Mr. Lovato that this is an
incorrect characterization of his legal conclusions.52

Mr.

Lovato also incorrectly characterizes the trial court's
alimony award as being based solely on the parties' income
disparity.53

Mr. Lovato's incorrect characterizations of the

trial court's rulings constitute bad faith.
Mr. Lovato's incorrect characterizations of the trial
court's rulings are also counter to the trial court's
specific factual findings.

Mr. Lovato contends that, "The

children should not be required to suffer in order to permit

51
52
53

See Appellant's Brief at page 14.
See copy of Judge Nehring's Minute Entry dated March 23, 2000.
Compare Appellant's Brief at page 29 with copy of Divorce Decree
at pages 10-13 and copy of Amended Divorce Decree at pages 9-14.
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Ms. Lovato to have a higher standard of living."54

Mr.

Lovato propounds this argument to this Court despite the
fact that the trial court specifically found that Mr. Lovato
has the ability to both increase his income and reduce his
expenses.55

Mr. Lovato could also certainly cease his

wasteful use of the judicial system's scarce resources.56
Mr. Lovato's manipulation of the interests of his children
for this purpose is particularly tragic in light of the fact
that Mr. Lovato has refused to pay temporary alimony to Ms.
Lovato and this has caused the children's visitation with
Ms. Lovato to suffer.57

In summary, Mr. Lovato's brief makes

evident the broad extent of Mr. Lovato's bad faith.
Therefore, this Court should reject Mr. Lovato's brief in
its entirety.
Alimony:
Sufficiency of the Evidence:
As argued above, Mr. Lovato's actual dispute is not with the

54
55

See Appellant's Brief at page 29.
See copy of Divorce Decree at pages 11-12. See also copy of
Amended Divorce Decree at pages 12-13, para 44.
56
See "Course of the Proceedings" and "Summary of Relevant Facts"
Sections of this Brief. See also copy of Divorce Decree at page 14.
See also Appellant's Brief at page 29.
57
See copy of Divorce Decree at page 12, para 39.
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sufficiency of the evidence.

Instead, Mr. Lovato is

attempting to dispute the evidence itself at the appellate
level.

The trial court reviewed voluminous evidence in this

divorce action before reaching its decision.58

After

reviewing all the evidence, the trial court entered very
detailed factual findings with respect to the alimony issue.
Mr. Lovato has simply failed to carry his burden to show any
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.59

In Coleman v.

Coleman, the husband in that case also had "failed to rebut
the presumption that he had the ability to pay alimony as
ordered by the court and the court was not in error in
finding defendant in contempt on that basis."60

This Court

should affirm the trial court's alimony award.
Contrary to Mr. Lovato's argument, an abuse of
discretion would have resulted had the trial court awarded
Ms. Lovato a lower alimony amount.
58

In 1983, the Utah

See "Course of Proceedings" Section of this Brief. See also Utah
R. Civ. P. 52(a) and Richie v. Richie, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), both addressing the unique position of the trial court
to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.
59
Higlev v.Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983) (quoting Dority v.
Dority. 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982))._
60
Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1983). The Court in
this case also found that federal bankruptcy statutes did not
preclude the state district court from entering a money judgement
for delinquent support payments. Id. at 1158.
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Supreme Court in Higley determined that the award of
permanent alimony to the wife in that case of only $100 per
month constituted a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion because the award amount was too low.61

In that

case, the wife was forty-seven years old, had a high-school
degree and no income.62

Furthermore, her efforts as a

homemaker enabled her husband to build a career as an
aircraft welder.63

The husband was also able as a result of

her efforts to work on occasional welding jobs to provide
for the family.64 In the meantime, other than a few sporadic
jobs, the wife had allocated her efforts toward managing the
home and caring for the children, thereby foregoing
employment training, experience, income and benefits.65 The
trial court in this case on similar facts did not make a
similar mistake.
A review of the relevant facts in this case reveals a
strong resemblance to Higley and further indicates that the
trial court's award of alimony to Ms. Lovato in this case is
61
62
63
64
65

Higley,
Id. at
Id. at
JcL at
Id. at

676 P . 2 d a t
380-381.
381.
380-381.
381.

382.
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correct.

Ms. Lovato is forty-seven years old and has only

limited education and work experience operating an
occasional craft booth business and housecleaning.66

As a

result of Ms. Lovato's efforts managing the home and caring
for their children, Mr. Lovato has also been able to build
his career and work at two jobs.67

The trial court found

specifically that Mr. Lovato would not have the marital home
or other property he has today had it not been for Ms.
Lovato's efforts throughout their marriage.

"As a matter of

public policy, the Court expects the Respondent's monthly
alimony payment is the first obligation of the Petitioner's
to be met, because without the Respondent's efforts during
the marriage, the Petitioner would not have a home or other
property he enjoys today."68

In view of the facts in this

case and their remarkable similarity to the facts in Higley,
it would have been a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion to award a lower alimony payment to Ms. Lovato.

66

See copy of Divorce Decree at page 11. See also copy of Amended
Divorce Decree at page 13.
67
Id. at 11. See also copy of Amended Divorce Decree at pages 1213.
68
See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 13 .
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Offset:
Mr. Lovato7s argument regarding the alimony being an
offset for child support is fatally flawed in several
respects. First, Mr. Lovato is wrong on the facts.

The

trial court specifically found that Mr. Lovato has the
ability to both increase his income and reduce his
expenses.69

Mr. Lovato has opted to forego increasing his

income and reducing his expenses and has instead opted to
pursue ongoing
litigation.70
Furthermore, the trial court explicitly rejected Mr.
Lovato's unfair characterization of its ruling as merely
being an alimony award offset by child support.71

The trial

court's award of alimony to Ms. Lovato should be sustained
because the facts and circumstances of this case amply
support the award.72
Second, Mr. Lovato is wrong on the law.

69
70

Alimony, child

Id. at pages 12-13, para 44.
See "Course of Proceedings" and "Summary of Relevant Facts"
Sections of this Brief.
71
See Judge Nehring's Minute Entry dated March 23, 2000.
72
See copy of Divorce Decree at pages 10-13. See also copy of
Amended Divorce Decree at pages 9-14.
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support and other monetary amounts awarded in divorce
actions are often offset against each other,73

In Utah Dept.

of Social Services v. Adams, this Court held that the exhusband's $200 per month child support obligation could be
set-off in exchange for allowing his ex-wife and children to
live rent-free in a home he owned which had a fair market
rental value of $350 per month.74

Furthermore, this Court

termed the position of the Utah Department of Social
Services that such a set-off was not possible as a
"curiosity" and an "economic absurdity."75

As another

example, in Coulon v. Coulon, the husband's equity in the
marital home in that case was reduced by the trial court
after being offset against his child support arrearage
existing at that time.76

This Court affirmed this result.77

Mr. Lovato's position is a curiosity considering Utah law.
In part, this practice was affirmed in Coulon because it

73

See Claudia Catalano, Annotation, Spouse's
Right To Set Off Debt
Owed By Other Spouse Against Accrued Spousal Or Child
Support
th
Payments,
11 A.L.R.5 259 (1993). (Right depends on particular
circumstances involved.)
74
Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991)
75
Idi.
76
Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069, 1070 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
77
Coulon, 915 P.2d at 1072.
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is consistent with sound public policy.
Court recognized that

In Coulon, this

"[T]his result is consistent with the

policy prohibiting a plaintiff from delaying an action until
after a defendant's counterclaim is barred by the statute of
limitations."78

Application of this policy makes particular

sense in this case where Mr. Lovato has filed for
bankruptcy, has consistently proven his unwillingness to pay
the alimony he lawfully owes to Ms. Lovato79 and where he has
even implied a similar intention in the future.80

The trial

court's application of sound public policy to the specific
facts in this case should similarly be affirmed.
Equalizing Standards of Living:
Mr. Lovato's argument that the trial court did not equalize
the standards of living of the parties should similarly be

78

Id. See also North Am. Land Corp. v. Boutte, 604 S.W.2d 245, 247
(Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
79
See copy of Divorce Decree at page 12, para 3 9 where Mr. Lovato's
refusal to pay alimony to Ms. Lovato affected her visitation with
the children. See also "Course of Proceedings" and "Summary of
Relevant Facts" Sections of this Brief.
80
See Appellant's Brief at page 26. ("If, for any reason, Mr.
Lovato is unable to pay alimony . . .") Ms. Lovato under Coulon
could have lawfully sued to reduce Mr. Lovato's equity in the
marital home because of Mr. Lovato's persistent refusals to pay the
alimony he owed Ms. Lovato. Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069, 10721073 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Cf. Hoaaland v. Hoaaland, 852 P.2d 1025,
1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Wife was even entitled to statutory
interest on temporary alimony arrearages under §15-1-4.)
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rejected because it lacks merit.

The issue of determining

standard of living in alimony cases is "fact-sensitive" and
because the court must consider "all relevant facts and
equitable principles/7 we defer to the court's sound
discretion in determining the parties' standard of living."81
The trial court attempted to equalize the standards of
living of the parties as nearly as possible.

"Therefore, it

is reasonable for (Mr. Lovato) to pay in alimony at least
$900 per month which will allow (Ms. Lovato) to live in a
reasonably comparable standard of living as does (Mr.
Lovato)." 82

Furthermore, Mr. Lovato's efforts to "equalize"

the parties' standards of living present a factual dispute
and Mr. Lovato's calculations are unfair to Ms. Lovato.83

In

conclusion, all of Mr. Lovato's arguments with respect to
the trial court's award of alimony should be rejected.

81

Hoaaland v. Hoaqland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(discussing issues of timing of determination)(quoting Howell v.
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991)).
82
Divorce Decree at page 12, para 39 and 40 (alteration added). See
also Amended Divorce Decree at page 13, para 49.
83
See Appellant's Brief at page 15. (Mr. Lovato decides that
"storage is unnecessary with an apartment" as he recalculates Ms.
Lovato's living expenses.) Refer also to Mr. Lovato's disagreement
with economies of scale discussed in the first subdivision of the
"Argument" Section of this Brief.
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Attorney's Fees:
Mr. Lovato also unreasonably argues that the trial court
should not have ordered him to pay both parties' attorney's
fees.

"We have previously held that Section §30-3-3 affords

divorce litigants "a broader award of reimbursement, if need
be, for the expenses of litigation, than those
reimbursements authorized in other civil cases."84

The trial

court exercised its sound discretion in ordering Mr. Lovato
to pay both parties' attorney's fees and based its order on
clearly sufficient evidence.
It has been necessary for the Respondent to secure the
services of an attorney to represent her in this action
which has been made unnecessarily lengthy and time consuming
because of Petitioner's domestic violence against
Respondent, his financial and visitation demands on
Respondent, and his unwillingness to make reasonable efforts
toward settlement.

Petitioner is in the better position to

pay Respondent's attorney's fees and he should be required

84

Rappleye v. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260, 265 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (in
this case the Court held that this section is even applicable to
accounting costs) (quoting Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). See also Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) .
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to pay the Respondent's attorney's fees and costs of at
least $8995.85
Since the trial court both exercised its sound
discretion and based its award on clearly sufficient
evidence, the award of attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato should
be affirmed.
Contrary to Mr. Lovato's assertions, the trial court
would have abused its discretion had it not awarded
attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato in this case.

In Haumont v.

Haumont, this Court further stated, "The court abuses its
discretion in awarding less than the amount [of attorney's
fees] requested unless

the reduction is warranted."86

Since

Mr. Lovato's appeal is frivolous and has been filed in bad
faith, the award of attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato is also
warranted under both Utah statutory law and the rules of
this Court.87

In Rappleye, this Court ruled that the trial

85

Divorce Decree at page 14, para 51. See also Appellant's Brief at
page 29.
86
Rappleye, 855 P.2d 265-266 (quoting Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d
421, 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
87
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (applicable if action without merit and
if filed in bad faith) and Utah R. App. P. 33 (applicable to appeal
brought from an action which is properly determined to be in bad
faith and is necessarily frivolous). See also first subdivision of
"Argument" Section of this brief discussing Mr. Lovato's bad faith
in filing this appeal.
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court had abused its discretion when it ordered a sua sponte
reduction from the amount of attorney's fees requested by
the wife in a divorce action absent any articulable reason
for doing so.88

The trial court in this case clearly

considered the factors in Rappleye for determining
attorney's fees.89

Therefore, the award of attorney's fees

should be affirmed.
Close consideration of the factors in Rappleye also
reveal that not awarding attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato would
have been an abuse of discretion in this case.

The trial

court considered the difficulty of this litigation, which
has been made "unnecessarily lengthy and time consuming" by
reason of the actions of Mr. Lovato.

As a result of Mr.

Lovato's prolongation of this litigation, Mr. Lovato has
incorrectly characterized his court-ordered payment of
attorney's fees as a "living expense."90

Furthermore,

although Mr. Lovato disputes paying Ms. Lovato's attorney's
fees, Mr. Lovato apparently is able to maintain payments to

88
89
90

Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 265.
Id.
See Appellant's Brief at pages 15 and 18.
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his own attorneys for this appeal.91

However, another result

of Mr. Lovato's prolongation of this litigation has been
that Ms. Lovato's attorneys have now been required to expend
copious hours on this case.

Nevertheless, the factors

favoring the award of attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato do not
end here.
Additional factors also favor the award of attorney's
fees to Ms. Lovato.

Ms. Lovato's attorney practices and is

experienced in the area of domestic relations.

She is

familiar with the rates charged in this locality for similar
services and her fees are comparatively reasonable in light
of her expertise.

This Court affirmed another award of

attorney's fees on similar grounds in Osguthorpe v.
Osguthorpe.92

It is only fair under these circumstances to

require Mr. Lovato to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney's fees.
Ms. Lovato is also entitled to attorney's fees on
appeal.

"Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded

below to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will

91
92

See Appellant's Brief at page 15 n.57 and page 23 n.76.
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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also be awarded to that party on appeal."93

This Court found

that Ms. Rappleye substantially prevailed on the issues on
appeal and remanded to the trial court to consider the
attorney's fees incurred by Ms. Rappleye on appeal.94

Since

remand is unnecessary in this case, this Court should award
Ms. Lovato attorney's fees incurred as a result of this
appeal.
Trial Court's Judgement That Equity Of The Marital Residence
Should Bear An Interest Rate
This Court should affirm the trial court's judgement that
Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital residence should bear an
interest rate.

The rule in Utah is that this determination

is within the discretion of the trial court.95

In Crofts,

Argyle and Osguthorpe, the determinations of the trial
courts that interest should not be awarded were affirmed in
all of these instances.96

The trial court's judgement in

93

Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 266 (quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Accord Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).
94
Id. at 267.
95
David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Divorce & Separation:
Award of

Interest

On Deferred

Installment

Payments Of Marital

th

Asset

Distribution,
10 A.L.R.5 191 (2001) (citing Crofts v. Crofts, 21
Utah 2d 332, 334, 445 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1968), Argyle v. Argyle,
688 P.2d 468, 472 (Utah 1984)).
96
See Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 754 (Utah 1978) (A higher rate of
interest than provided for a late payment of cash ordered paid in a
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this case should also be affirmed.
The trial court's judgement makes particular sense
considering the facts in this case.

The trial court

recognized that the present value of the payment of the
balance lawfully owed Ms. Lovato, if deferred, would
diminish over time.

The trial court initially attempted to

avoid such an inequitable result by offering Mr. Lovato the
opportunity to refinance the marital residence, or through
some other manner, to satisfy Ms. Lovato7s judgement within
thirty days from trial.97

If Mr. Lovato was unable to

satisfy Ms. Lovato's judgement within this time period, the
marital residence was immediately to be sold.98

Recognizing

also that this would represent a hardship for the children,
the trial court modified its order in the Amended Divorce
Decree.99

However, Ms. Lovato at that time under Coulon

could have also lawfully sued to reduce Mr. Lovato's equity
property division in a divorce action will be affirmed where the
property division is reasonable and equitable.) See also Stroud v.
Stroud, 738 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 758 P.2d 905
(Utah 1988) (A judgement for child support arrearages should bear
the statutory rate of interest until paid in full. Furthermore, the
trial court may raise this interest rate if equity so requires under
§30-3-5. )
97
See copy of Divorce Decree at page 9, para 31.
98
Id. at para 32.
99
See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at pages 6-9.
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in the marital home because of Mr. Lovato's persistent
refusals to pay the alimony he owed Ms. Lovato.100

The trial

court instead allowed Mr. Lovato to pay more gradually and
also opted to conserve scarce judicial resources. The trial
court's award of interest at the post-judgement rate (then
6.513% per annum) represented the fairest result for all the
parties involved.101

Therefore, this result should be

affirmed.
The result reached by the trial court not only comports
most closely with the best interests of all the parties
concerned in this case, but is also clearly supported by the
law in Utah and other jurisdictions.

In Adelman v. Adelman,

the husband was held to be entitled to interest on his fixed
equity in the martial home.102

His interest originated from

the date of the order first establishing his equity

100

Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P. 2d 1069, 1072-1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Cf. Hoaaland v. Hoaaland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(Wife was entitled to statutory interest on temporary alimony
arrearages under §15-1-4.) See also Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d
1155, 1158 (Utah 1983) ("Installments of support payments ordered in
a divorce decree become vested in the recipient when they become
due." citing Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706, 708 (Utah 1977) and
Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Utah 1977)).
101
See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 8, para 32.
102
Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P. 2d 741, 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
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therein.103

Mr. Lovato now maintains the very same claim in

this case that the wife maintained and that this Court
rejected in that case.104

This Court also acknowledged in

Adelman that the husband's equity could be reduced by the
amount of his alimony arrearage in addition to any accrued
interest.105

Thus, the result reached by the trial court in

this case is consistent with Utah law.
The result reached by the trial court in this case is
also in accord with the law of other jurisdictions.

One

husband was required to either sell certain corporate stock
or to pay the wife her share in periodic installments with
interest over twenty years.106

In another case, an early pay-

off provision was held to be a proper incentive for a
husband who had a history of failing to comply with court
orders.107

However, it was an abuse of discretion to award

the wife lower interest than the statutory rate on property
installment settlement payments, absent provision of an

103
104
105
106
107

Id^
IdL a t 745.
I c L a t 746.
In Re Marriage of Harding, 533 P.2d 947, 950 (Colo. App. 1977).
In Re Marriage of Stenshoel, 866 P.2d 635, 642 (Wash. App. 1993).
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adequate reason.108

Another reviewing court decided that it

was within the discretion of the trial court to order the
payment of interest where the husband contended that the
payment of this interest would be an undue burden on him and
that he would be unable to support himself if he was
required to pay it.109

The trial court in this case

specifically ordered Mr. Lovato to execute a special
warranty deed110 and the payment of interest according to the
provisions of warranty deeds is recognized under Utah law.111
Thus, the specific facts of this case, Utah law, the law of
surrounding jurisdictions and sound public policy support
the judgement of the trial court.
Fire Insurance Proceeds:
The trial court's ruling with respect to paying Ms. Lovato
her fair share of fire insurance proceeds should also be
affirmed.

In a divorce action, the Court's duty to make

108
109

Id.
In Re Marriage of Wessel, 715 P.2d 45, 49 (Mont. 1986). See also
Cotton v. Cotton, 439 So.2d 309, 310 (Fla. App. D2 1983), review
denied, 447 So.2d 886 (Fla.)(where an alimony award was divided into
thirty-nine equal quarterly payments with interest compounding at
the statutory rate or option to pay entire amount with interest
accruing until paid.)
110
See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 9, para 35.
111
Powell v. Bastian, 541 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1975) .

39

equitable divisions of property encompasses all assets
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived, including insurance.112

The trial

court correctly concluded that insurance proceeds are a
marital asset.113

Mr. Lovato collected $17,404.58 from an

insurance company after a fire occurred in the marital
residence in 1998.114

He later testified at trial that he

used most of the insurance proceeds for his own personal
living expenses.115
marital home.116
situation.117

Ms. Lovato was no longer living in the

Mr. Lovato is the wrongdoer in this

Both the facts and the law support the trial

court's ruling with respect to the award of one-half of the
fire insurance proceeds to Ms. Lovato.

Therefore, the award

should be left undisturbed.

112

Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd. , 949 P.2d 779, 783 n.7
(quoting D O Q U V. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Utah 1982) and Englert
v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978)). See also Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-433 (Utah 1982).
113
See copy of Divorce Decree at page 10, para 31.
114
Id.
115
See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 7, para 27.
116
Id. at para 2 8.
117
See Appellant's Brief at page 33 where Mr. Lovato discusses
collateral source rule and reasons that Ms. Lovato is the wrongdoer.
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CONCLUSION:
For the reasons stated herein, Ms. Lovato respectfully
requests this Court to affirm the trial court on all of the
foregoing issues.

Furthermore, Ms. Lovato also requests

this Court to estop Mr. Lovato from further abusing her and
the judicial system through his groundless prolongation of
this litigation.

Since this appeal also lacks merit, Ms.

Lovato also asks that this Court award her' attorney's fees
for the costs of this appeal.

Considering the facts and

circumstances of this case, Ms. Lovato also prays for any
other relief that this Court deems necessary and proper.

DATED, this

/)

day of June, 2001.

KELLEY & KELLEY, LLC

10NICA Z. "KELLI
Attorney for Re(g£>ondent/Appellee
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
-oooOooo—
EDWARD F. LOVATO,
Petitioner,

)

vs.

)

PETRA LOVATO,

)

Respondent.

)

PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS
TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
and to DIVORCE DECREE
Case No. 974904424DA
Judge: Ronald E. Nehring
Commissioner: Thomas N. Amett

•oooOooo—
I
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Edward F. Lovato, by and through his counsel of record, Ronald C. Barker, hereby
submits his objections to the Court's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to the
proposed Divorce Decree submitted by counsel for Respondent. If for any reason those documents
have been signed, then Petitioner Moves the Court pursuant to URCP 59 and other applicable Rules,
for an order correcting the Findings, Conclusions and Decree in the manner and for the reasons
stated below. Without attempting to re-state each suggested change, Petitioner also renews his

[-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree

request that the changes suggested in his 9/27/99 "Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law," the content of which is incorporated herein by reference.

n
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OBJECTIONS TO "AMENDED" DECREE
Judgment is not an "Amended Decree"
1. Amended decree. The document is improperly labeled as an "Amended Decree," whereas
it is merely a supplement order which disposes of issues reserved when the 5/4/98 divorce decree
was entered. The divorce itself is final and was not changed by the supplemental trial to resolve the
reserved issues. The term "Amended Decree" implies that the prior divorce decree may have not
been a final judgment. A more appropriate title for the document would be "Order re Reserved
Issues," or some such more descriptive title.

IY
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS & DECREE
A
OBJECTIONS TO ALIMONY
Petitioner objects to various provisions of the proposed Findings, Conclusions and Decree. By
reason of the nature of many of the objections, no attempt has been made to propose revised
wording.

3-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree

2. Petitioner lacks ability to pay alimony. The Court's Finding ^[53 and Decree % 44, and
other related provisions, incorrectly find: (i) that Petitioner's standard of living is higher than
Respondents,' (ii) that she has a need for alimony to obtain suitable housing to meet her parenting
responsibilities, and (iii) that Petitioner has the ability to pay alimony by reducing his living
expenses, and by working a second job. Those findings are in error for various reasons, including
the following:
Reducing transportation expense
(a) Petitioner's automobile expenses.

The Court erroneously concluded that

Petitioner's S2751 per month automobile expense could be reduced, and the saving applied toward
alimony. Petitioner drives a minimum of 650 miles to work each month,2 and estimates that he
drives a minimum of 200 per month transporting the children to activities, driving to the grocery
store, church, and for other family purposes, for a total of not less than about 850 miles per month.
IRS (very conservative) regulations3 fix the per mile cost of driving an automobile at 32.5^ per mile.
Using that rate per mile, Petitioner's monthly cost is S276,4 which is slightly higher than the S275
listed by Petitioner as his monthly automobile expense. As a practical matter, Petitioner's vehicles
are old, repair and maintenance costs are much higher than if he had a newer vehicle, and they must
be replaced within a reasonable time, and the $275 includes insurance on his vehicles. Petitioner's

1

The S275 per month automobile expense includes automobile insurance of about S83 per month, which
leaves only SI92 for gasoline, maintenance, repair and depreciation (or replacement cost).
2

30 miles round trip each day X 5 = 150 miles per week X 4 1/3 weeks per month = 650 miles per month.

3

Rev. Proc. 97-58. See 1999 U.S. Master Tax Guide § 945, page 275.

4

800 miles X 32.5? =S260.
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vehicle payments of approximately S560 per month5 are being paid through his bankruptcy, and are
not included as part of his automobile expense. It is not realistic to conclude that Petitioner, with
his need to drive to work and to meet the minor childrens' transportation needs, could reasonably
reduce his automobile expense to free up money to pay alimony, and to impose an alimony upon him
based upon such a speculation. Petitioner objects to the Court's conclusion that Petitioner can
reduce his automobile expense, and thereby create the ability to pay alimony.
(b) Respondent's automobile expense. Respondent lists her automobile expense as
$421 per month. After deducting her S251 payment, and S60 insurance, her net operating cost is
SI 10 for one person, as compared with Petitioner's comparable monthly cost ofS192 for himself and
two children. Petitioner's operating costs are also increased because he drives a large van to
accommodate the needs of the children, while Respondent drives a smaller vehicle.6
Reducing "other expenses"
(c) Petitioner's expenses. Petitioner's other expenses are at a poverty level, and cannot
reasonably be further reduced, as suggested by the Court, to make money available for alimony. The
children should not be deprived of necessities to improve Respondent's lifestyle. For example:
(1) Food & household supplies. Petitioner's food and household supply cost is S400
per month for three persons, or S133 per month, S4.38 per day, and S1.46 per meal, per person. The
actual amount available for food is less than this amount, since the S400 also includes household

Petitioner estimates that his vehicle payments were about S560 per month, however they have not been
included as automobile expense because they are being paid through his bankruptcy and they are part of his monthly
payment to the bankruptcy trustee.
6

Respondent drives a compact (small) automobile, which is believed to be a 1998 Mercury Tracer.
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supplies. Petitioner's cost is S250 per month for one person, or about S8.22 per day, and $2.74 per
meal. Respondent is allowed SI .28 more per meal than Petitioner and the children combined. If an
expense is to be reduced to allow Respondent to acquire more suitable housing, it cannot be by
further reducing food and household supplies for the children, but rather, should be acquired by
reducing Respondent's allowance for those items. Petitioner objects to the Court's conclusion that
his food should be reduced tofindfunds to pay alimony to Respondent.
(2) Petitioner's "other expenses." Petitioner's "other expanses" are at abare-bones
level. He lists only minimal amounts for three persons, while the same amount for only one person
on Respondent's list are much higher. Petitioner lists S130 for entertainment and incidentals, or $43
per person, while Respondent lists S300 for the same items. Funds to pay alimony cannot
realistically be obtained by further reducing the children's living costs. Petitioner objects to the
Court's finding and conclusion that funds are availablefromthat source to pay alimony.
(3) Respondent's "other expenses." On the other hand, Respondent's expenses can
be readily adjusted to provide funds to rent an apartment. For example, if she has an apartment
where she can visit with and entertain the children, the following items marked with "*" could
readily be applied to rent. Respondent should not have a higher standard of living than Petitioner.
Items marked with "~" have been adjusted to the same per-person amount as has been allowed to
Respondent and the children. If reductions in Petitioner's living standards are to be made to assist
Respondent in obtaining an apartment, those reductions should apply equally to the Respondent Petitioner and the children on the one hand, and Respondent on the other hand. If those adjustments
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are made, Respondent will have about S651 per month available to pay rent, or for other purposes,
as demonstrated below:
Rent (now being paid)
Entertainment (now $200-adj. to $33)
Incidentals (now $ 100 - adj. To $ 10)
Storage (unnecessary w/apt.)
Clothing (Now $30-adj. to S10)
Food (S250-adj. to $133)
Total reduction in expenses

$ 200*
167*90*~
57*
20117$ 651

Overstatement of Respondent's expenses
(4) Respondent's expenses are overstated. Respondent's monthly living expenses
are overstated by $131.44. Respondent lists child support payments as $317.16, and children's
medical as S75.59, for a total of S392.75. However, under the prior order Respondent has only paid
S261.31 per month, which results in a S131.44 overstatement of her monthly living expenses.
Without considering the S651 overstatement discussed in the preceding paragraph, at a minimum
to correct said S131.44 error, the SI,825.75 total expenses listed in^f 48 of the Findings, and in ^f 39
of the Decree, should be corrected to $1,694.31.
Payment on attorney fees
(d) Attorney fees. In f 67 and 68 of the Findings, and % 57, 59 and 60 of the Decree,
the Court concludes that Petitioner must pay attorney fees of not less than $19,8117 - an
overwhelming task. If he were able to pay even $ 100 per month to each attorney, for a total of $200

7

Not less than $8,040 fees incurred by Petitioner and SI 1, 771 incurred by Respondent, a total of S 19,811.
Actual fees owed by Petitioner to his attorney are now several thousand dollars higher as a result of post-trial work.
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per month,8 and if no interest were charged, it would take about 99 months or 4 Vi years to pay the
attorney fees. If Petitioner is unable to work out satisfactory arrangements for payment of attorney
fees, he will probably be required to somehow include those payments in his pending bankruptcy,
which will substantially increase the monthly payment to the bankruptcy trustee, and further reduce
his ability to pay alimony. As a practical matter, ordering Petitioner to pay Respondent's attorney
fees will make payment of alimony virtually impossible. Petitioner objects to the Court's Finding
Tf 68 and Decree \ 60, that "Petitioner is in the betterfinancialposition to pay Respondent's attorney
fees," is not supported by the evidence, is an abuse of discretion, and because, as a practical matter,
Petitioner simply lacks the ability to pay Respondent's attorney fees. See also discussion following
the chart in \ 2(j) below.
Available funds
(e) Error in Court's computation. In % 50 of the Findings, and ^ 41 of the Decree, it
appears the Court's computations may be in error. Ex. 2 shows Petitioner's bi-weekly pay as
SI, 434.02, not 51,484.90. If we reduce that amount by the 530 tool allowance, the net bi-weekly
amount is S1,404.02. If we multiply that by the 26 pay periods per year, Petitioner's annual income
is 536,504.52 - 12 months = 53,042.04, rather than the 53,253 computed by the Court, as stated in
Tf 41 of the Decree - an overstatement in Petitioner's income of 5210.96 per month.
(1) Corrected child support. The corrected child support to be paid by Respondent,
based upon the corrected amount per the child support worksheet, is S322.66, for a total payment,
including medical, is 5439.33.

8

It appears that realistically Petmoner may be able to pay a total of only SI 00 per month on fees, which
would take about 8 1/4 years.
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(2) Petitioner's corrected income.

Correcting Petitioner's income results in

changing f 43 of the Decree, to a net income of $2,467.85, with the child support and medical
reimbursement being changed to $439.33, and the total net monthly income changing to $2,907.18.
(3) Federal income tax deductions.

The court has deducted nothing from

Petitioner's income for payroll taxes, based upon the assumption that he will owe no taxes.
Petitioner objects to the Court using the temporary tax status as a basis for fixing long-term alimony,
since his income tax liability will change as circumstances change. Further, since ^f 56 of the Decree
requires Petitioner to pay to Respondent an amount equal to one-half of the income tax benefit from
claiming the children, his income tax liability is understated by claiming the children as dependents,
even though he must pay one-half of the tax benefit to Respondent. Respondent cannot have it both
ways. Petitioner should either receive credit for the federal S132.139 per month withholding tax
deducted from his income to arrive at his net available funds, or he should not be ordered to pay
Respondent one-half of the income tax benefit from claiming the children as deductions. The
Court's order as written double-counts the federal income tax benefits, and the Findings and Decree
should be corrected.
(4) FICA payroll tax deductions. The Court's decision incorrectly fails to deduct
FICA taxes of S194.5710 paid by Petitioner. That $194.57 should be deducted from Petitioner's
income to arrive at his net available funds for purposes of determining his ability to pay alimony.

9

Ex. 2 shows that S60.98 is deducted from Petitioner's bi-weekly check - X 26 weeks in a year =
S 1,585.48 per year- 12 months = S132.13 per month.
10

Ex. 2 shows that FICA taxes of S89.80 [S17.02 & S72.78] were deducted from his bi-weekly check, X
26 pay periods = 52,334.80 per year - 12 months = 194.57 per month.
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(5) Utah income tax payments.

Ex. 6 shows that Petitioner's 1998 Utah State

income tax was S275, or about S22.92 per month. Ex. 2 shows that Utah withholding tax was
S87.4911 per month. Whichever amount the Court decides to use, that amount should be deducted
from Petitioner's income to arrive at his net available funds for purposes of determining his ability
to pay alimony.
(6) Petitioner's net available funds. In ^ 52 of the Findings, and in Tf 43 of the
Decree, the Court incorrectly determined that Petitioner has $3,043 available funds from which to
pay monthly expenses. The amount of Petitioner's available funds stated in f 43 of the Decree
should be changed from 53,043 to $2,492.93, computed as follows:
Corrected monthly income ft[ 2(e) above]
Add: corrected child support ffl 2(e)(1)]
Total available funds before deductions

$3,042.04
439.33
3,481.37

Deductions:
Deduction per Court ft 43 & 43 of Decree] 574.19
Federal income tax withheld ft 2(e)(3)]
132.19
FICA taxes ft 2(e)(4)]
194.57
Utah income taxes ft 2(e)(5)]
87.4912
Corrected deductions
Corrected net available funds

988.^4
'$2.492.93

(7) Petitioner's monthly expenses increase to cover attorney fees. The Court
should modify the Findings and Decree, including Tf 42 of the Findings, and ^f 43 of Decree, to state
that, in addition to the $3,043 of monthly expenses listed therein, Petitioner will be required to pay
11

Bi-weekly Utah withholding tax is S40.38 [Ex. 2] X 26 pay periods per year = 51,049.88 per year + 12
months = S87.49 per month.
12

If we use Respondent's 1998 income taxes of Utah S275 [Ex. 6], then Petitioner's Utah income tax
would be $22.29 per month and the corrected net available funds would be 52,558.13.
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additional amounts of attorney fees, or an increased amount to the bankruptcy trustee, if he is unable
to work out a reasonable payment arrangement with the two attorneys, and is required to include
those obligations in his bankruptcy.
(f) Imputed income. In ^ 53 of the Findings, and 44 of the Decree, the Court concludes
there is insufficient evidence to impute additional income to Petitioner, but then attempts to justify
the award of alimony by actually imputing income to him by its finding that Respondent should be
able to generate income from a second job from which to pay alimony. Gounsel for Petitioner has
been unable to locate any authority for the proposition that a husband should be ordered to take a
second job to pay alimony to his wife, particularly where, as here, his income is insufficient to meet
the basic needs of the children of the parties and his self, and there are no facts to support imputed
income. Further, Petitioner's ability to hold a second job is severely restricted by his need to care
for the two children, and due to health problems and financial stress. Alimony attempts to equalize
the ability of the parties to go forward with their lives.13 The Court has addressed only Respondent's
alleged needs, yet not the ability of each party to go forward with their lives. See discussion and
computation in ^ 2(j) below.
(g) Paying alimony instead of court-ordered payments to bankruptcy trustee. The
Court erred in its determination in ^f 54 of the Findings, and ^ 46 of the Decree, that Petitioner should
pay alimony instead of making payments to the bankruptcy trustee. Ability to pay is a major factor
in determining whether alimony should be awarded.14 If Petitioner fails to make his payment to the

Howell v. Howell, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah App. 1991)
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995)
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bankruptcy trustee, his bankruptcy will be dismissed, the home and vehicle mortgages will be
foreclosed, his wages will be garnished, and he will be unable to support the children, or to pay
alimony. The Court's finding that alimony should be paid by Petitioner, in view of his limited
income, the cost of supporting the children, his bankruptcy, etc., is in error, and that error is
compounded by the Court's finding that Petitioner should pay alimony instead of making courtordered payments to the bankruptcy trustee. This case is factually similar to that in EndrodyJ5 where
health problems and child care responsibilities hampered the husband's ability to return to his former
occupation.
(h) Respondent's work history. Petitioner objects to the language in ^ 47 and 48, to
the effect that he has the ability to earn a much greater income, and that Respondent has allegedly
not been employed, and that she has a limited earning capacity. To the contrary, Respondent has
been heavily involved in craft, housecleaning, etc. business for many years, and has earned a
substantial income. Respondent is in good health, has no dependents, and can work a second job
without interfering with family responsibilities, unlike Petitioner if he worked a second job.
Respondent's full-time job supplements her other business activities. The finding, as stated, is
misleading and incorrect.
(i) Equalizing standards of living. Petitioner objects to Finding ^57, and Decree^ 49,
because they misstate the evidence and facts. If the parties' standards of living and income were to
be equalized, it would be necessary for Respondent to pay alimony to Petitioner. See chart in ^f 2(j)
below, and discussion following that chart.

15

Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ap. 1996).
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(j) Funds available to parties.

The following summary demonstrates Petitioner's

inability to pay and the inequality which will result from the Court's alimony order:
Funds available to each partv is as follows:
Total
income
Gross income [% 44 & 39 of Decree]
Child support & medical [worksheet]
Alimony ft[ 49 of decree]
Adjusted income [per decree]
Corrections:
Petitioner's income [«j 2(e) above]17
F I C A tax ft 2(e)(4) above]
Utah withholding ft2(e)(5) above]18

Correction of support [worksheet]19
Fed. withholding tax ft 2(e)(3) above]20
Total corrections
Income after corrections

16

See«[

55,567.00
-0-05.567.00
(
(

210.96)
194.57)
( 134.33)
-0f 128.00)
667.86
$4,899.14

Husband's
Income
S 3,253.00
439.69
( 400.00)
3.292.69

Wife's
Income
$2,314.0016
( 439.69)
400.00
2.274.31

210.96)
194.57)
134.33)
-.91)
128.00)
668.77)
52,623.92

-0-0-0.91

^7
S 2,275.22

in Findings & ^38 of the Decree.

17 This S210.96 reduction in Petitioner's monthly earnings, as shown in ^ 52 of the Findings and ^ 41 and

43 of the Decree, where the Court concluded that 52,643.09 is Petitioner's monthly income, before adding S439.69
of child support and medical payments to be paid by Respondent to Petitioner. See ^ 2(e) (above) where Petitioner
asks the Court to correct that error.
The corrected computation is as follows: S 1,434.02 per week - S30 tool allowance = S 1,404.02 X 26 pay
periods per year = S36.504.52 - 12 month = S3,042.04 per month. This is S210.96 less than the S3,253 per month
shown in * 52 of the Findings and ^41 of the Decree.
18

Utah withhold tax on bi-weekly earnings of SI,300.93 [Ex. 4] with three (3) exemptions is S62 x 26 pay
periods in a year = S 1,612 per year - 12 = S 134.33 per month. This amount has been used in the foregemg
computation.
19

The corrected child support worksheet shows a total obligation of S439.33 instead of S439.69 used by
the Courting 52 of the Findings and*[43 of the decree, a decrease of 91^.
20

This is the monthly Federal withholding tax shown on Petitioner's pay stub, converted from bi-weekly
to monthly. This amount is small because Petitioner claimed ten (10) exemptions [Ex. 2]. He will now only be
entitled to three (3) exemptions, which will increase his the amount withheld from his paycheck. Petitioner's biweekly Federal withholding tax will be S128 with three exemptions [Petitioner & 2 children] with a taxable income
of SI,300.93 [Ex. 4] shown in ERS Circular E. If we convert that to a monthly basis, Peunoner's federal
withholding tax will be S128 per month, which is the amount we have used above.
As noted in ^ 2(e)(3) above, if Petitioner's income tax liability is reduced because he claims the children as
exemptions and receives the earned income credit, and he is then required to pay to Respondent Vi of the income tax
savings resulting from his claiming all of the children, he will then have a net income tax liability at least equal to lA
of the amount he pays to Respondent. He should be allowed credit for income tax which he is paying through
withholdmg. Respondent will, in effect, receive her share of any income tax refund from the tax savings which in \
? t :-_ ^i__ r>»

1 m ZA ^e*u* r,v,^,Mrre. +u* fVuirf hoc nrdt»rt*d Ppririnner tn m v tn Respondent

Income after corrections (Trior page)

Total
income

Husband's
Income

Wife's
Income

$4,899.14

52,623.92

S2,275.22

Less: Debt Service

1.603.00

1.603 0021

-0-

Net funds available to each partv

3,296.14

1,020.92

2,275.2222

Monthly living exp.[«143 & 39 of decree]

1.440 002!

3.266.75

1.826.7522

Monthly surplus or (deficit) with alimonv

S

29.39

(S 419 08)

S 448.47*

Monthly surplus or (deficit) w/o alimonv

$

29.39

(S

S 48 47

19.08)

(k) Alimony should be paid to Petitioner. If we add to Petitioner's debt service,
a reasonable monthly payment toward his own attorney fees (over SI ljOOO),23 and the SI 1,771 the
Court has ordered him to pay toward Respondent's attorney fees, the result will be to deprive the
family of bare necessities. The children should not be required to suffer in order to permit
Respondent to have a higher standard of living. If it is the Court's intent is to equalize the available
funds between the parties, as it has ruled in ^ 53, 57, etc., of the Findings, and in Tf 44, 49, etc., of
21

22

Petitioner's debt service is as follows
Country Wide Home Loans - Is1 mortgage
Salt Lake City Credit Union - 2nd mortgage
Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee
Total monthly payments

S861
139
598
SI 603

See If 55 & 56above.

21

In f 52 of the Findings & 43 of the Decree, the Court found Pentioner's Monthly Living Expenses to be
S3,043 However, since SI,603 of debt service has been deducted above, Pentioner's Monthly Living Expenses has
been reduced to S 1,440 [S3,043 - Sl,603 = S 1,440]
22

The Court has allowed Respondent SI,826 for living expenses for one person, and only $1,440 for three
persons, or an average of S480 per person. This means that Respondent is being allowed S 1,346 per month more
for living expenses than is being allowed to Petitioner and each of the children. As note in *l 2(c)(4) above, if
Respondent were required to reduce her monthly living expenses to the same amount as is being allowed to each of
the Petitioner and the two children, she would have an extra S651 available, which would more than sufficient to
rent a suitable apartment.
23

In ^f 67 of the Findings and % 59 of the proposed decree, the Court has ordered Petitioner to pay his own
attorney fees, which were then $8,040 Post-tnal services have increased that obligation to over $11,000.
J r*

J

o

r\

the decree, as proposed by Respondent, it would be necessary to order Respondent to pay alimony
to Petitioner to assist him in meeting the crushing financial obligations required to support the two
children and himself. This is clearly not a case where alimony or attorney fees should be awarded
to Respondent.24
B
ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED
3. Petitioner lacks ability to pay attorney fees. For the reasons discussed in ^ 2 above,
specifically including f 2(j), it is clear that Petitioner lacks the ability to pay Respondent's attorney
fees. Respondent is in a better financial situation to pay her attorney fees than is Petitioner.
Although he is in bankruptcy, Petitioner must pay his own fees, which approximate the amount of
Respondent's fees. To add S11,000 to that obligation makes it unrealistic to assume Petitioner could
pay Respondent's fees. As demonstrated above, Petitioner simply has no funds with which to pay
his own attorney fees, let alone Respondent' s attorney fees. On the other hand, Respondent is single,
without dependents, and has (if in effect) been ordered to pay only a net of S39.69 toward supporting
the children. She has the ability to resume her house cleaning business, or to increase her craft
business income, by working a few extra hours each week. On the other hand, Petitioner's ability
to work a second job is impaired because of his health problems, the time he needs to spend caring
for the children, helping with school work, preparing meals, supervising their activities, and doing
all of the things that a good parent needs to do for teenage children. The children need Petitioner

24

If the S400 per month alimony is disallowed, then Petitioner would have a monthly
deficit of about S20 and Respondent would have a monthly surplus of about $50. However, the
foregoing computations do not consider the fact that the Court has ordered Petitioner to also pay
Respondent SI 1,771 in attorney fees. In addition to his own fees of $8,040, a total of over
$19,811. Petitioner simply has no money with which to pay alimony or Respondent's attorney
fees.

even more because of the divorce. It is not appropriate to require Petitioner to be away from the
children working a second job so Respondent can enjoy a better standard of living. On balance, if
one party is ordered to pay the fees of the other party, it is Respondent who is in a better position to
pay Petitioner's fees, than is Petitioner to pay Respondent's fees. Utah case law favors requiring
each party to pay their own fees "where neither party reasonably has the ability to pay the other
party's attorney fees."25 A very recent Utah Case includes an extensive^iscussion regarding the
award of attorney fees.26 Each party should be ordered to pay their own attorney fees.
C
RESPONDENT'S EQUITY SHOULD NOT BEAR INTEREST
4. Interest should not accrue on Respondent's lien, under Utah Law. Even though
Respondent's complaint did not request interest on the home equity, in ^ 41 of the Findings, and in
f 32 of the proposed Decree, the Court awarded interest at the 6.513% statutory post-judgment rate
on Respondent's SI5,399.70 hen on the family home. In Osguthorpe11 the Appellate Court affirmed
denial of interest on divorce liens, and held as follows:
According to Section 15-1-4 (1986), all judgments, other than those rendered on
a lawful contract, shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum.28 In addition,
25

Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App" 1990). The award of attorney fees must be based on
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness
of the requested fees. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
26

27

Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 976 P.2d 1, 1999 Utah App 109, 1999 WL 190502.
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 536 (Utah App. 1990).

2S

Utah rate of interest on judgment as provided by UC 15-1-4 was reduced effective 5/3/93. See Brown
v. David K. Richards & Co., 976 P.2d 1, 1999 Utah App 109, 1999 WL 190502.
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the trial court in a divorce proceeding cannot stay statutory accrual of interest on a
judgment for unpaid child support. Stroud v. Stroud, 758 P.2d 905,906 (Utah 1988).
However, an equitable lien, unlike a judgment, only gives the lien-holder a right
to collect the debt out of the charged property. Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg., N. V.,
663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983). A judgement on the other hand, is "the final
consideration and determination of a court on matters submitted to it in an action or
proceeding. (Emphasis added).
The decree awarded plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of the Chris Lane home
subject to a non-interest bearing equitable lien in favor of defendant for one-half of
the present equity in the home. The court stated that the hen amount should be
$22,500 and should be paid to defendant when plaintiff remarries, cohabits, sells the
home, movesfromthe home, or when the youngest child reaches the age of majority,
whichever occurs first. The equitable lien awarded defendant has not been
reduced to judgment. Thus, defendant was awarded an equitable lien to which
interest does not attach under section 15-1-4. We therefor affirm the trial court's
award to defendant of a non-interest bearing equitable lien on the parties' property
for S22?500. (Emphasis added).
5. Award of interest makes the lien larger than the home equity. If for any reason interest
could properly be awarded on a divorce created lien on marital property, it is an abuse of discretion
to do so in this case, because with interest, Respondent is awarded SI,623 more than the foil equity
in the home, computed as follows:
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(1) Value of home (Findings K 34)

5130,000

(2) Unpaid trust deeds on home: (Find. ^ 34)
Countrywide Home Mtg.
Salt Lake Credit Union
Total mortgage liens

5100,156
9,398
109,554

(3) Net eauitv
(4) Lien awarded to Respondent

20,446
15.400

(5) Petitioner's remaining equity
(6) Interest on 515,400 @ 6.513 [Decree«[ 32]

5^)46

thru 6/24/0629 =

6.669

(7) Petitioner's negative equity in home

5

1.623

D
WINDFALL RE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
6. Insurance proceeds was not a marital asset. In ^ 41 of the Findings, and f 26 and 31 of
the proposed Decree, the Court incorrectly held that 514,913.58 of insurance proceeds from a fire
was a marital asset, and awarded Respondent S7,456.79, as one-half of that amount, and included
it as part of Respondent's lien on the home. Prior to the fire, the parties owned a marital home which
was worth S130,000. After the home was repaired by Petitioner and others who assisted him, it was
still worth 5130,000. The court awarded one-half of that 5130,000 to Respondent. By also awarding
her a lien for S7,456.79 (plus interest) as one-half of the unused insurance proceeds, Respondent has
realized a 57,500 windfall. If Petitioner had done all of the work himself, which work was done after

29

Between 11/1/99 and 624/06 is 2,427 days. Simple interest on SI5,400 @ 6.513% per annum = $1,003
per year - 365 = S2.748 per day X 2,427 days = S6,669.40.
IB-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree

the parties separated,30 surely it could not reasonably be argued that Respondent should be entitled
to share in the value of his work. The Court found that upon separation the parties ended their
economic partnership. From, and after, that date the home was, in effect, owned by Petitioner.
Respondent is not entitled to a windfall by sharing insurance proceeds which were not part of the
marital estate. The fact that others assisted him with the work and expense does not change the
situation.
E
WINDFALL RE COLLATERAL SOURCE REPAIRS
7. Collateral source doctrine precludes award of value of labor for fire damage repairs
to Respondent. As discussed above, the fire damage repairs were made by Petitioner and others
who assisted him. Respondent is not entitled to receive a windfall because Petitioner did not employ
a contractor and pay him for the repairs, but instead obtained repairs from his "Collateral Source."
That labor was from a "collateral source," generated solely by Petitioner, in which Respondent is
not entitled to share. In Dubois31 at page 825 the Utah Supreme Court ruled:
The collateral source rule provides that a wrongdoer is not entitled to have
damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff has received
or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from an independent
collateral source. (Emphasis added).

The Court fixed the date of separation as the date for valuation of the marital estate. See ^ 3 of the
Findings and ^ 2 of the proposed decree.
31

Dubois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978).
1^-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree

In the 1997 Gibbs28 case, at page 345, the Utah Supreme Court quoted the foregoing language
with approval. Applying Utah Law in 1994 the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals FDIC29 case cited the
Gibbs case with approval. The "Collateral Source" doctrine is still the Law in Utah. To award
Respondent a share of fire insurance proceeds because the repairs were made from a "Collateral
Source" is a clear violation of Utah Case Law.
F
FUTURE ATTORNEY FEES
8. Provision re future attorney fees violates Utah Law. In f 71 of the Findings, and \ 63 of
the proposed Decree, the Court orders the defaulting party to pay attorney fees which may be
incurred in the future. Utah Law is clear that attorney fees may only be awarded where they are
allowed pursuant to a contract or statute. No contract exists which authorizes the award of future
attorney fees. UC § 30-3-3(1) authorizes the Court to award attorney fees in a divorce proceeding.
UC § 30-3-3(2) authorizes the Court to award attorney fees in an action to enforced an order in a
domestic case, but gives the Court which hears that matter discretion to award or deny fees based
upon its determination of such things as: (a) which party "substantially prevailed," (b) if a party is
"impecunious," or (c) for other reasons entered into the record. The proposed future award would
violate that statute, and may improperly deprive a future judge, who might hear such matters, of
some or all of his statutory discretion.

Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U. S. Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997).
FDIC v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 20 F. 3rd 1070, 1083 (10th Cir. Utah 1994).
20-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree

IY
CONCLUSION
For various reasons, including those discussed above, the Court should change its ruling in this
case to, among other things, (a) not award any alimony, (b) not award any attorney fees, (c) not
award Respondent a share of fire insurance proceeds, (d) not award interest on Respondent's lien,
(e) not order attorney fees as to future proceedings to enforce this decree^f) not refer to the order
in this matter is an "Amended Decree of Divorce," (g) correct the amount of child support to be paid
by Respondent, and (h) reserve an issue as to medical reimbursement owed by Respondent to
Petitioner (bills approximating $1,284.92 have been submitted to Respondent by Petitioner which
she has not paid or acknowledge her obligation to pay one-half of that amount, or S642.46). In the
alternative, judgment should be entered in favor of Petitioner, and against Respondent, for that
amount, or the Court should otherwise make an order concerning that amount.
Dated October 26, 1999.

Ronald C. Barker, attorney for Petitioner--"
V
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the *-£ day of October, 1999,1 caused a copy of the foregoing to be
mailed, postage prepaid, to Monica Z. Kelley, KELLEY & KELLEY, 1000 Boston Building, 9
Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

v^^lC
Ronald C. Barker
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MONICA Z. KELLEY (#7563)
KELLEY & KELLEY
Attorneys for Respondent
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-6686
Fax: (801)531-6690

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN .AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD F. LOVATO.
Petitioner.

RE5Pe-VDE?rT5 PROPOSES " ^ ^
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
PETRA LOVATO.
Respondent.

Civil No. 974904424DA
Judge Ronald E. Nehring
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett

Respondent. Petra Lovato. by and through her counsel of record, Monica Kelley, hereby
submits her Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for the Court's consideration as this
matter is set for bench trial on September 3, 1999.
Marital History
1.

Petitioner and Respondent were married on May 26. 1984 and were married for 13

years when they separated on or about August 16. 1997.
2.

At the recommendation of the Honorable Pat Brian and in furtherance of the

convenience of the parties', the Coun bifurcated the divorce proceeding and the Order for Bifurcation
and Decree of Divorce based on irreconcilable differences was entered on May 4.1998. At that time,

the parties had been married almost 14 years.
3.

At the time the bifurcation was ordered no determination was made as to when the

marital estate would be valued, and the parties would have been married more than 15 years in
September 9, 1999.
Child Custody, Visitation and Support:
4.

The parties have two minor children born as issue of this marriage: Christopher Julian

Lovato, age 13 born April 18, 1986, and Alexander Daniel Lovato. age 11 born June 24. 1988.
5.

There are no other proceedings regarding the children's custody pending in a court of

this state or any other state.
6.

The parties should be awarded the joint legal custody of the minor children, with the

primary physical custody awarded to the Petitioner, subject to Respondent's reasonable and liberal
right to visit with the minor children.
7.

Visitation should occur as the parties agree. If they are unable to agree, visitation

should occur according to the schedule set forth under UCA 30-3-35 and the parties should
incorporate the Advisory Guidelines for visitation found in UCA 30-3-33 in their visitation practices.
8.

Petitioner is employed by Salt Lake County Corporation and earns a salary of S3.217

per month gross income. In addition, he supplements his income through work at his auto body shop
which he operates to earns an additional income of S 1.500 per month.
9.

Respondent is employed by O.C. Tanner Companj and earns S8.95 per hour, or S 1.551

per month gross income* In addition, she supplements her income through her craft booth business
and earns an additional income of S250 per month.

11.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7 et seq. (1953 as amended) it is reasonable and proper that

the Respondent be ordered to pay Petitioner as child support S324.56 per month which calculates the
parties child support obligation according to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines and income from
one full-time job. Respondent's child support obligation should continue until the youngest of the
minor children becomes 18 years of age. or has graduated from high school during the child's normal
and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later. Respondent's child support obligation
should be recalculated as provided for by law. and at minimum when the eldest child turns 18 years of
age. or has graduated from high school during that child's normal and expected year of graduation,
whichever occurs later. Each of the parties should be under mutual obligation to notify the other
within ten (10) days of any change in monthly income.
10.

Respondent's base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time

periods during which the child is with the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written
agreement of the parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. However, normal visitation and
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day
requirement.
11.

Respondent shall pay her child support obligation to Petitioner one-half by the fifth day

of every month and one half by the twentieth day of e\ery month, or otherwise as the parties may
agree.
12.

Respondent has paid temporary child support through the pendency of this action and

has no child support arrearage due to the Petitioner.
13.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.15 (J 953 as amended). Petitioner shall maintain insurance

for medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children, and Petitioner should provide verification
of coverage to the Respondent, along with enrollment information and participating care providers, to
the Respondent each year by January 2nd. The Petitioner shall notify the Respondent of any change of
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date that Petitioner first knew or
should have known of the change.
14.

Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by

a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion shall be calculated by dividing
the premium amount by the number of the parties' children. Presently, Petiuoner maintains the health
insurance coverage for the minor children, but pays no out of pocket monthly premium expense.
15.

Bouh parties shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical

expenses, including deductibles and copayments. incurred for the minor children and actually paid b\
the parties. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
16. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with the
above verification requirements.
17.

The children are of an age and maturity where they do not require the supervision of

day care provider.
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obligations:
18.

Throughout the parties marriage. Petitioner was the primary income earner and

regularly worked more than one full time job to support the family financially. Respondent was a

stay-at-home parent who worked odd jobs and maintained a small craft business to supplement the
family income.
19.

At the time of separation, the parties owned the following joint debt: Countrywide

Home mortgage for the marital residence, John Paras Furniture for household furniture. Granite
Furniture for carpet in the marital home, RC Willey for a dining room set, and a van automobile loan.
All debt should be awarded to Petitioner as his sole and exclusive obligation, and he should be ordered
to hold Respondent harmless on these debts and obligations for the following re^on^ These debts are
included with Petitioner's bankruptcy petition and are related to property to be awarded to the
Petitioner under this divorce. Had the parties remained married, these debts would have been paid
from Petitioner's income from his employment as he was the primary income earner. Finally.
Respondent lacks the ability to pay these debts.
20.

Petitioner's obligation to pay these marital debts should be deemed his obligation in
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Any debt

included in Petitioner's bankruptcy petition filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 9832926 should be Petitioner's sole and e\clusi\e obligation to pay, and he should hold Respondent
harmless thereon.
21.

Petitioner should be ordered to assume and pay, and hold the Respondent harmless

from liability on. all debts and obligations incurred by the parties prior to their date of separation in
August 1997. and thereafter, all debts and obligations contracted by the parties should be the
responsibility of the party who incurred the particular debt.
22.

Respondent should be ordered to assume and pay, and hold Petitioner harmless from

s

liability on, any and all debts and obligations incurred by her since August 1997.
Provisions Relating to Personal Property:
23.

During the marriage, the panies acquired certain items of personal property. Said

personal property should be awarded to the panies as follows.
24.

To Petitioner:
Most household appliances, electronics, shop tools, furniture, pictures, old living room
set with all its tables, boy's bedroom furniture. 1994 GMC Van. 1965 Pomiac. 1988
Dodge Caravan and other personal property identified on Petitioner's bankruptcy
petition valued at SI2.290.

25.

To Respondent.-

BEDROOM AND MISCELLANEOUS
Chest from bedroom
Mrs. Thomas's little couch
Swag from bedroom
Picture from bathroom and wreath
Dryer
LIVING ROOM
3 new couches
Wicker stand with all its ornaments
Large tulip crate and doilies
Wall pictures including large one

Hanging plants
FAMILY ROOM
Family videos - Respondent's family
Shelves with their ornaments
Round table with chairs
Share of children's photos and videos
KITCHEN
Half of pois and pans. plaves. cups silverware tic.
Baking sheets and bowls. Recipe books
Kitchen towels and miscellaneous cooking items
RESPONDENTS OFFICE
Picture frames, picture copies, frame samples
Clothes in closet
Brown vacuum cleaner
PANTRY
Some of church's canned food supplies
Wood and craft supplies
Old records
WORK SHOP
Scroll machine
Band saw machine

All craft supplies including iron flower holder, Christmas greenery, ribbons and ribbon
holder, spray cans, fabric remnants etc.
GARAGE
Table saw machine, some Christmas ornaments, gardening supplies, wood ladder.
YARD
Plant cuttings of her choosing.
26.

The Petitioner and Respondent should cooperate in the exchange and duplication of

their children's photographs and videos. Within thirty days from trial, the panies should collect the
photographs and videos and their possession and divide them as they choose. If both panies wish to
have the same photo or video, a duplicate should be made and the panies should share the cost of
duplication.
27.

All property acquired by the panies post-separation should be awarded to the person

who acquired the property, subject to him or her assuming any and all debt related to the property and
holding the other pam' harmless thereon, with the exception of any and all non-contributory retirement
benefits, which should be divided equally at the time of the entry of the final decree of divorce.
Real Property:
28.

During the course of the marriage, the panies acquired a home and real property located

at 5896 West Dixie Drive. West Valley City, Utah.
29.

Presently, the home has a value of at least Si 29,000 and has debt of S99.000, resulting

in total equity of S30.000. Both panies should be awarded 50% of the equity accrued during the
marriage, or $15,000 each.

30.

As Respondent has no financial assets with which to reestablish a residence or build a

future outside of those assets acquired during the marriage, it is reasonable and proper that she should
be awarded the right to collect her 50% home equity interest from Petitioner should he decide to
maintain possession of the marital home.
31.

Petitioner should have the opportunity to buy out the Respondent's 50% equity interest

accrued during the marriage within thirty (30) days from the date of trial. Respondent should be
awarded judgement against Petitioner in the amount of SI 5.000 which Petitioner should have the
opportunity to satisfy by refinancing the marital residence or some other manner to satisfy
Respondent's Si 5.000 judgment lien within 30 days from trial. If he is able to satisfy" her judgment
interest. Petitioner should be awarded the home and real property as his sole and exclusive property,
subject to him assuming and pa\ ing the mortgage obligation, all tax. insurance and maintenance due,
and hold the Respondent harmless thereon.
32.

If Petitioner is unable to satisfy Respondent's judgment lien after thirty' days from the

trial date, men the home should be immediately placed on the open market for sale by a licensed real
estate agent agreed to by the parties, at a price recommended by the real estate agent. .Any offer within
five percent (5%) of the recommended listing price should be accepted by the parties, and the proceeds
of the sale applied as follows:
a.

First, to pay expenses of sale:

b.

Second, to retire any and all mortgages and liens;

c.

Then the balance remaining thereafter to be divided equally between the parties,

whether or not that balance meets or exceeds the anticipated 530,000 equity interest

Q

stated herein.
33.

Both parties should be ordered to execute all necessary documents to effectuate the sale

of said property as requested by any real estate agent, loan officer or title company agent.
;34.

In addition to the value of the home equity, Respondent is entitled to recoup from

Petitioner 50% of the fire insurance proceeds from a fire which occurred in the marital residence in
1998. After the panies separated, Petitioner received SI 7,404.58 as compensation for fire damage to
the marital home and he has never accounted to Respondent for this amount. Insurance proceeds
being a marital asset, Respondent is entitled to receive one-half of the proceeds collected by the
Petitioner. Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner in the amount of S8.702.29.
Alimonv:
35.

Presently, Petitioner earns an income more than double that of Respondent. His

income earning history, except for 1998 when he was off work due to disability, shows he has always
been the primary income earner beuveen die two panies. and has consistently and regularly earned the
bulk of the household income. Over a five year period. Petitioner has earned approximately 76% of
the combined marital income and Respondent has earned approximately 24% of the combined marital
income, as shown below:

should terminate upon Respondent's remarriage, cohabitation or death. Should Petitioner's obligation
to pay alimony terminate due to Respondent's cohabitation or remarriage, Respondent's obligation to
pay monthly child support will be revived.
Pension and Retirement Assets:
44.

The Petitioner has a pension plan or other retirement benefits through his place of

employment. Salt Lake County Corporation. It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent receive
50% of all benefits accrued by Petitioner since the date of the marriage up to the time of the entry of
the final divorce decree and judgment, as Petitioner's retirement benefits are non-contributory in
naaire.
: 45.

Respondent should be awarded any gains or losses on her 50% share of Petitioner's

retirement benefits awarded to he: in this divorce action after the time of the entry of the final divorce
decree.
46.

Petitioner should be responsible for preparing a Qualified Domestic Relations Order

(QDRO) to effectuate such a division, and the parries should be ordered to share equally any costs
charged by the retirement plan administrator to administer the QDRO.
47.

Respondent has acquired a small 401(k) account with a value of less than S600 since

the parties." separation which should be awarded to her entirely as her sole and exclusive property.
Restraining Order:
48.

Petitioner should be permanently restrained from bothering, harassing, annoying,

threatening, or harming the Respondent at her residence, employment or any other place.
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56.

The Court should grant such other and further relief as it may deem just and appropriate

in this matter.
DATED this 2 _ day of
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BY THE COURT:

Honorable Ronald E. Nehrins Q
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I herebv certify that on the

dav of

_, 1999,1 caused to be delivered by

fax and mail, a true and correct copy of the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law to the following:
Ronald C. Barker
2870 South State St.
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
fax: 486-5754
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MONICA Z. KELLEY (#7563)
KELLEY & KELLEY
Attorneys for Respondent
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-6686
Fax: (801)531-6690

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD F. LOVATO,
Petitioner,

)
1
)

vs.

]

PETRA LOVATO,

:

Respondent.

)
)
)

AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Civil No. 974904424DA
Judge Ronald E. Nehring
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett

The above-captioned action came trial on September 3, 1999, the Honorable Ronald E.
Nehring presiding. Trial continued to September 8, 1999 and concluded on September 10, 1999.
Petitioner was present at all times and represented by counsel, Ronald C. Barker and Respondent was
present at all times and represented by counsel, Monica Z. Kelley. The Court, having received
evidence and heard the testimony of the parties and witnesses, and having considered the exhibits and
reviewed the file and the pleadings on file herein, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, it is now therefore,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-entitled matter on Ma\ 4.

1998 wherein the parties were granted a decree of divorce based on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences. This Amended Decree of Divorce serves to address all issues of custody, visitation,
property division and support not addressed in the Bifurcated Decree of Divorce previously entered.
2.

The parties separated on or about August 16, 1997 and on that date as a practical

matter, the parties' ended their economic partnership. Accordingly, the valuation of property and
obligations shall be fixed to the extent possible as of that date.
Child Custody, Visitation and Support:
3.

The parties are hereby awarded the joint legal custody of the two minor children born

as issue of this marriage: Christopher Julian Lovato, age 13 born April 18. 1986, and Alexander Daniel
Lovato, age 11 born June 24, 1988, with the primary physical custody of the children awarded to the
Petitioner, subject to Respondent's reasonable and liberal right to visit with the minor children.
Petitioner and Respondent shall share the rights, privileges, duties and powers of a parenthood,
pursuant to UCA 30-3-10.1 (1953 as amended).
4.

Visitation shall occur as the parties agree, with the Respondent having liberal and

frequent access to the minor children. If they are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, then
Respondent's visitation schedule shall not less than the schedule set forth under UCA 30-3-35. The
parties shall further adhere to the Advisory Guidelines found in UCA 30-3-33 for their visitation and
custody practices.
5.

Petitioner is employed by Salt Lake County Corporation and earns a monthly gross
2

income of $3, 153, which does not include compensation for his tool allowance or income from an\
other source.
6.

Respondent is employed by O.C. Tanner Company and earns a gross monthly income

of $1,551, plus an additional $250 per month from her craft business, for a total combined monthh
income of $1,801.
7.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7 et seq. (1953 as amended) Respondent shall pay to

Petitioner child support of $364.00 per month.
8.

Respondent's child support obligation shall continue until the youngest child becomes

18 years of age, or has graduated from high school during the child's normal and expected year of
graduation, whichever occurs later. Respondent's child support obligation shall be recalculated as
provided for by law, and at minimum when the eldest child turns 18 years of age, or has graduated
from high school during that child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later.
9.

Respondent's base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time

periods during which a child is with the Respondent by order of the court or by agreement of the
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. However, normal visitation and holiday visits to the
custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement.
10.

Respondent shall pay her child support obligation to Petitioner one-half by the 5' da>

of even' month and one half by the 20th day of even' month, or otherwise as the parties may agree
11.

Respondent has paid temporary child support through the pendency of this action aiu:

has no child support arrearage owing. As Respondent is current in her child support obligation to
Petitioner, automatic income withholding shall not be ordered. However, to further the convenience
3

of the parties, the Petitioner and Respondent mav coordinate the pajment of child support through
automatic deposit to the recipient's bank account on a regular monthlv basis
12.

Pursuant to U.C.A §78-45-7.15, Petitioner shall maintain insurance for medical

expenses for the benefit of the minor children, and Petitioner shall provide verification of coverage to
the Respondent, along with enrollment information and participating care providers, to the Respondent
each > ear by Januar> 2nd. The Petitioner shall notify the Respondent of an> change of insurance
carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date that Petitioner first knew or should
have known of the change
13.

Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the health insurance premium

actuall> paid by Petitioner for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion shall be
calculated by dividing the premium amount b> the number of the parties' children. Presentlv,
Petitioner pays $151.19 per month for health and dental insurance coverage for the minor children
and Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner her 50% obligation of S75 59 along with her monthlv child
support pa> ment.
14

Respondent's combined monthl} obligation to Petitioner for child support and

insurance reimbursement shall be $439.69.
15

Both parties shall share equall) all reasonable and necessan uninsured medical

expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the minor children and actualh paid b^
the parties A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the co^t a u
pa> merit of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 davs of pavment
16

Respondent shall pa> one half of all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical

t

expenses Petitioner has incurred during the pendency of this action, subject to Petitioner presenting to
her verification of expenses actually paid.
17.

A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the

expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with the
above verification requirements.
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obligations:
18.

Petitioner, shall assume and pay any and all outstanding debt as his sole and exclusi\ e

obligation and indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless on the following debts and obligations:

19.

a.

Countrywide Home Mortgage - $100,156 for 1st home mortgage

b.

Salt Lake Credit Union - $9,398 for 2nd home mortgage

c.

John Paras Furniture: $869.52 for couch, stereo, vacuum and VCR

d.

Granite Furniture: $1,119.41 for carpet installed in marital home

e.

RC Willey: $656.83 for dining room set

f.

Salt Lake County Credit Union, $19,609.43 for motor vehicle loans

Any debt listed in the Petitioner's bankruptcy petition and not otherwise provided for

herein, shall be the sole and exclusive obligation of the Petitioner and he shall indemnify and hold the
Respondent harmless thereon.
20.

The parties shall share equally the uninsured medical expenses totaling $4,560 fir

hospital, dental and pharmacy bills for the minor children accrued during the marriage and prior to the
parties separation. Respondent shall pay her one-half obligation toward theses expenses ($2,280) b\
reducing her lien on the marital home by that amount.
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Provisions Relating to Personal Property:
21.

All personal property not the subject of debt described in Paragraph 18 herein, shall be

distributed between the parties through an alternating selection to be first exercised by the Petitioner
The distribution shall occur at a time agreed upon by the parties and shall be supervised by counsel or
counsel's designee.
22.

The Petitioner and Respondent shall cooperate in the exchange and duplication of their

children's photographs and videos. Within thirty days from trial, the parties shall collect the
photographs and videos and their possession and divide them as they choose. If both parties wish to
have the same photo or video, a duplicate shall be made and the parties shall share the cost of
duplication.
23.

All property acquired by the parties' post-separation shall be awarded to the person

who acquired the property, subject to him or her assuming any and all debt related to the propem a* J.
holding the other party harmless thereon.
24.

No joint bank, deposit or investment accounts are owned by the parties. Each part)

shall be awarded his or her bank, deposit or investment account owned by him or her exclusi\el> a:
the time of trial.
Real Property:
25.

During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a home and real propem located

at 5896 West Dixie Drive. West Valley City, Utah, which has a value of 5130,000. At the time of
separation, the home had debt of SI09,554 from the first and second home mortgages, resulting v:
total equity of $20,446. Each party shall be awarded 50% of the equity accrued during the marriage.

6

or $10,223.
26.

In 1998 Petitioner received insurance proceeds of SI 7,413.58 to compensate the panics

for property damage caused by a fire in the marital home. The insurance proceeds are found to be a
marital asset. The parties stipulated that Petitioner paid $2,500 from the insurance proceeds to pay for
repair to the fire-damaged home, but the Petitioner failed to satisfactorily trace the balance of the
insurance proceeds to expenses related to home repairs.
27.

Petitioner testified at trial that he used most of the insurance proceeds for his living

expenses and bills while he was not working in 1998 due to illness, and that Respondent should not be
entitled to recover any portion of the insurance proceeds since the work was, in fact, done and to
award Respondent reimbursement of the unused insurance proceeds would be to reward her for the
benefit of Petitioner's effort and relationships which were used in making the repairs to the home.
28.

At the time of the fire, Petitioner was living in the home by himself and Respondent

had no control over how the repairs were done or who did them. Petitioner alone made that
determination, and he chose to have them done at a discount and enjoyed the use of the insurance
proceeds for his general support.
29.

At trial, Petitioner testified that all the home repairs had been done in the same manner

as would a professional, only at no expense to him since the labor and materials were donated by
friends and church members. He testified that the home was fully repaired and that paying someone to
do the repairs or having them done at no cost resulted in the same condition, that the home was worth.
SI30.000 repaired, and therefore it was his prerogative to use almost SI5,000 as he saw fit.
30.

The Court found that the $14,913.58 not expended for home repair is a marital asset

7

and as such it shall be divided equally between the parties. Therefore, Respondent is awarded
$7,456.79, which equals one-half the value of the unused insurance proceeds.
31.

Respondent's ownership interest in the marital home is based on the home equity,

unused fire insurance proceeds, minus her obligation for joint medical expenses as follows:
50% of accrued equity

+ $10,223.00

50% of unused insurance

+ $ 7,456.79

Subtotal
50% joint medical

$17,679.79
- $ 2,280.00

Total
32.

$15,399.79.

Respondent is awarded a lien against the marital home in the amount of $15,399.79.

together with interest at the statutory post-judgment rate (presently 6.513% per annum).
33.

Petitioner shall immediately satisfy Respondent's lien upon the first of the following

events to occur:
a.

The home is sold;

b.

The youngest child turns 18 and graduates high school, whichever occurs la:er:

c.

The minor children cease using the home as their primary residence;

d.

The Petitioner remarries or cohabitates; or

e.

The Petitioner uses the home as security for new debt or obtains refinancing on

the home for any other purpose other than to satisfy Respondent's lien.
34.

Petitioner shall assume and pay any and all taxes, insurance, maintenance or other

obligation related to the marital home and indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless thereon.

8

35.

Respondent shall execute a special warranty deed subject to the lien described herein.

Alimonv:
36.

Throughout the parties' marriage, Petitioner has been the primary income earner ot^ the

household. He has always had a full-time job and presently is employed for Salt Lake CityCorporation in its maintenance division where he has worked for over 11 years.
37.

He also worked at his side business of auto body repair and owned a body shop in

Kearns, Utah that he has operated for approximately 10 years which is now closed following
Petitioner's eviction from the site of the body shop. Respondent testified that he earned between
SI,000 to $1,500 per month. Petitioner testified that the body shop had profitable years where he
earned $10,000 after expenses. Petitioner testified the shop has not been profitable for him since
1998. Petitioner testified he no longer operates the body shop and closed it a month before trial due to
his health problems and the demands of single parenthood. Petitioner testified that the shop was
usually profitable before 1997, but that due primarily to an illness, Petitioner lost customers and the
business became unprofitable.
38.

Respondent also worked throughout the marriage, but on a much smaller scale. She

had housecleaning jobs and also earned an income from her craft busines to support herself her
hobbies and to contribute extra money to the family expenses. Respondent operates her craft business
and earns S250 per month from the same. This is in addition to her income from her regular
employment at OC Tanner, where she has earned S15.99S.15 including overtime, holiday pay.
personal pay, profit sharing and vacation pay through August 21. 1999. Therefore. Respondent's 10CK
gross monthly income includes $2,064 from OC tanner employment, plus S250 per month from her

q

craft business, for a total combined gross monthly income of $2,314.
39.

From Respondent's gross income of $2,314 per month, she has necessary deductions of

$516.29 bringing her total net monthly income from all sources to $1,797.71. With approximately
$1,800 in net income, Respondent has a need for alimony as her present reasonable expenses include:
Respondent's Monthly Expenses
IRent or Mortgage Payments (Residence)

$200 0 0 |
250 CCS

• Food and Household Supplies
• Utilities Including Water, Electricity, Gas and Heat

75 001

• Telephone

25 Oo|

• Laundry and Cleaning

25 C0|

• Clothing

50.00J

• Medical, Dental Insurance & Expenses (Exclude Payroll Deducted)

30CJ|

• Payment of Child, Spousal Support re: Prior Marriage

317 1 5 |

• Entertainment (Includes Clubs, Social Obligations, Travel, Recreation)

200 C0|

• INCIDENTALS
1 Grooming

50.00

1 Gifts

50.00
100.CC 1

lAUTO EXPENSES
1 Auto payments

|

1 Insurance

J

60.00 |

1 Gas

j

60.00

1

1 Oil, Maintenance, Repair

J

50.00

j

251.00

42i c:J
• Installment Payment(s) - Monthly Debts & Obligations

1

I Storage USA
• Children's Monthly Healin and Dental Insurance Premium
• Other expenses not specifically requested above and specify below

ITOTAL EXPENSES

1

I

5~:;J
"5 5 r |

I
•j

]

]

S1.825.75J

40.

Respondent's present monthly expenses are artificially low because her rent is S200 per

month for a bedroom she rents in a home she shares with other adults and children. Both parties
testified to the need for Respondent to obtain proper housing so she can take the minor children for
overnight and extended visits. Because of her present housing situation, she is unable to visit with the
children for any extended period of time. Respondent testified at trial that in order to obtain suitable
housing for at least an apartment, she would pay rent of at least $500 to S600 per month. A reasonable
rental payment would increase her present expenses by $300 to $400 per month and her home utilities
would likely increase as well.
41.

Petitioner has the ability to assist Respondent with a monthly alimony payment.

Petitioner testified at trial he receives a regular salary from his employer, and receives the same
amount of pay every two weeks: $1,484.90. After deducting $30.00 per pay period for Petitioner's
tool allowance, his gross monthly income of $3,253.00.
42.

Petitioner's monthly deductions from gross income for state and federal income taxes,

life insurance, disability insurance, union dues are S400 per month. His health and dental insurance
cost for himself and 50% of the boys' insurance is an additional $174.19. According to Petitioner's
pay check stub Petitioner has little federal income tax withheld and his 1998 federal income tax return
shows he had no tax liability for 1998. Petitioner has a deduction of $166.66 per month for "Flex
Medical" which is his discretionary' medical savings account which the court does not consider to be a
non-discretionary deduction from his gross income.
43.

Therefore, Petitioner's non-discretionary deductions as well as basic medical ana life

insurance withholdings total $574.19 per month, and from the taxes withheld. Petitioner receives a
refund from his income taxes withheld. Thus, Petitioner's net income totals at least $2,643.09 per

month. Petitioner's net income of $2,643.09 plus child support and medical reimbursement of
5439.69 yields a total net monthly income to $3,082.78. From this, Petitioner has monthh li\ ing
expenses of S3.043.
Petitioner's Monthly Living Expenses
S1 005 001

(Rent or Mortgage Payments (Residence)
• Maintenance (Residence)

50 00]

• Food and Household Supplies

40CCCJ

• Utilities Including Water, Electricity, Gas and Heat

2S0 0 0 |

• Telephone

35 0 0 |

• Laundry and Cleaning

80 OOJ

• Clothing

30 0 0 |

• Medical, Dental Insurance & Expenses (Exclude Payroll Deducted)

60 001

• School Tuition, Activity Expenses

100 00J

• Entertainment (Includes Clubs, Social Obligations, Travel, Recreation)

1C0 00I

• Incidentals / Grooming

30 0 0 |

• Bankruptcy Trustee Payment

I

595 OCJ

• Auto Expenses

I

275 OCI

ITOTAL EXPENSES

l

$3,043.001

44.

Petitioner's standard of living is higher than that of Respondent's. He has greater

flexibility, even with his bankruptcy obligations, to reduce expenses, particularly transportation
expenses. It is equitable to shift to Petitioner the responsibility for accommodating Respondem's need
to obtain housing suitable to meet her parenting responsibilities. Although the Court has determined
that there is insufficient factual basis to impute additional income to Petitioner based on his no.
defunct auto body business, the Court is confident that he can generate income from this acti\n\. e\en
on a hit and miss basis which, when coupled with a reduction in expenses, is more likely than no: to

make it possible for Respondent to meet her legitimate housing needs through the payment of alinion;..
45.

Accordingly. Petitioner shall pay Respondent alimony in the amount of S400 per month

for a duration of time equal to the date of the parties' marriage through the time of trial, or 15 years.
46.

The Court acknowledges that this alimony award is insufficient to fully meet

Respondent's living needs and will leave Petitioner pressed financially to meet this obligation if he
does not generate as much supplemental business income as he has done in the past. However, the
Court views Petitioner's obligation to assist in Respondent's support as a primary obligation over that
of his obligation to his creditors in bankruptcy. As a matter of public policy, the Court expects the
Respondent's monthly alimony payment is the first obligation of the Petitioner's to be met, because
without the Respondent's efforts during the marriage, the Petitioner would not have a home or other
property he enjoys today.
47.

This alimony award is reasonable because Petitioner has a longer work history and

more marketable job skills than Respondent, he has the ability to generate a much greater income in a
short amount of time when compared to Respondent's work history and job skills. Petitioner is a 45year-old man and is at the prime income earning stage of his career.
48.

Respondent, on the other hand, has entered the work force full time for the first time at

the time of separation. She is a 47-year-old woman with limited work experience. Her work histor>
throughout the marriage includes primarily house cleaning and crafting.
49.

An alimony award of S400 per month will allow the Respondent an opportunit} to

equalize her standard of living to one comparable to what she enjoyed during the marriage and will
equalize the parties' respective incomes.
50.

Petitioner's monthly alimony payment shall be offset by Respondent's child support

and insurance share payment of $439.69, resulting in a net monthly payment from Respondent to
Petitioner of $39.69. This shall be paid by the Respondent one-half by the 5Ih day of each month, and
one-half by the 20th day of each month.
51.

Petitioner's alimony obligation shall terminate upon Respondent's remarriage,

cohabitation or death. Should Petitioner's obligation to pay alimony terminate due to Respondent's
cohabitation or remarriage. Respondent's obligation to pay monthly child support shall be revived.
Pension and Retirement Assets:
52.

Petitioner has a pension plan or other retirement benefits through his place of

employment, Salt Lake County Corporation. Respondent shall be awarded 50% of all pension benefits
accrued by Petitioner since the date of the marriage to August 16, 1997 pursuant to the Woodward
formula.
53.

Petitioner shall be responsible for preparing a Qualified Domestic Relations Order

(QDRO) to effectuate the division of the retirement benefits as ordered herein, and the parties shall be
ordered to share equally an\ costs charged by the retirement plan administrator to administer the
QDRO, anticipated to be S250 total.
54.

Respondent has acquired a small 401(k) account with a value of less than $600 since

the parties" separation which shall be awarded to her entirely as her sole and exclusive property.
Restraining Order:
55.

Each party shall be permanently restrained from bothering, harassing, annoying,

threatening, or harming the Respondent at her residence, employment or any other place.
Income Tax Provisions:
56.

The parties shall share equally the right to claim the minor children as dependents for

income tax purposes. Beginning with their 1999 state and federal income tax filings, the parties shall
coordinate their income tax return preparation and file their income tax returns by March 15th of every
year. Prior to March 15 l \ the parties shall cooperate in the exchange of the calculation of their income
tax returns with and without the dependent exemptions and determine which party would receive'the
greatest tax benefit from claiming the dependent exemption(s). The person with the greatest tax
benefit shall claim the dependent exemption(s) in any given year. The person who claims the
dependent exemption(s) shall isolate the value of the tax benefit attributed to the dependent exemption
only, and the claiming part}' shall pay the non-claiming party 50% of the benefit received.
57.

The claiming party shall make payment to the non-claiming party within thirty (30)

days of the receipt of any refund, or at the time the non-claiming party has tax due at the time of filing.
whichever occurs first.
58.

Should this process prove to be too time consuming, expensive, or cumbersome for the

parties based on their circumstances, the Court will entertain a Petition to Modify and make a direct
award to the parties the right to claim one child or the other as a dependent for tax purposes.
Attorney's Fees:
59.

Petitioner shall assume and pay his own attorney's fees, which have amounted to at

least $8,040.
60.

As Petitioner is in the better financial position to pay Respondent's attorney's fees, he

shall pay Respondent's attorney's fees and costs of SI 1,771 upon a showing of the reasonableness of
the same.

Maiden Name:
61.

The Court affirms Respondent's right to be restored the use of her former name of

"Petra Martha Cano."
Miscellaneous Provisions:
62.

Each party shall be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are

required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
63.

If either party defaults on his or her obligations as ordered in the decree of divorce and

judgment and it is necessary for the other party to seek enforcement of the Court's order, the nondefaulting party shall be awarded his or her attorney's fees and expenses for obtaining an enforcement
order against the defaulting party.

DATED this J L day oilt^^**^^

, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

THE HONORABLE RONALDM NEHRING
Third District Court Judse
Approved as to form

/

_ DEPUTY CO'J~T CLERK

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the V- day of fytfr/WL'

1999,1 delivered by fax and mail, a

true and correct copy of the AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE to:
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney at Law
2870 South State St.
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on September 30, 1999)

3
4

THE COURT: Good afternoon, ladies and
gentlemen.

5

MR. BARKER: Good afternoon.

6

THE COURT: We are here in Lovato versus

7

Lovato, No. 974904424.

Counsel, please state your

8

appearances for the record.

9

MR. BARKER: Ronald Barker for the petitioner

10

MS. KELLEY: Monica Kelley for the respondent

11

THE COURT: And we're here today for the

12

purposes of me giving you my decision in this case.

13

At the outset I want to thank both of you for taking

14

seriously my invitation to send me disks.

15

done is used the disk and liberally exercised my

16

editorial powers.

17

Seems like we need one more.

What I've

No, we don't.

18

We've got them all.

I don't want to keep the suspense

19

up here or anything.

Jill, could you make me another

20

-- oh, wait.

21

got to do a little

Oh, say it isn't so.

Excuse me, I've

—

22

COURT CLERK: Okay.

23

THE COURT: Oops.

This is my highest and

24

best use as a Judge, what I'm doing right here.

25

after you read this, you will agree.

-2-

Maybe

It may be useful

1

to take out the proposed findings and conclusions

2

that each of you prepared.

3

the agenda here is to just spend a little time not

4

going over the whole thing in great detail, but to go

5

over it and explain to you some of the high points of

6

why I didn't adopt some of the things that each of you

7

wanted me to adopt, and why I generally did.

What I expect to do as

8

So Jill, could you distribute these; one to

9

Ms. Kelley and one to Mr. Barker, and we'll be on our

10

way here.

11

child support.

12

Okay.

Not much exciting, until we get to
What I did was the following.

I determined that there was enough of a

13

pattern in Ms. Lovato's supplemental craft business

14

to include that.

15

I gave her a gross monthly income for the purposes of

16

support of $1,801.

17

You'll see that in paragraph 9.

So

The only deduction from the stated gross

18

I allowed to Mr. Lovato was the $30 tool allowance.

19

You'll see that referenced in paragraph 8, and he

20

has a total gross of $3,153, and this yields, by my

21

calculation off the worksheet, a child support payment

22

of $364.

23
24

When we come to the business of insurance,
it raises the question of how flex payments are to

25 I be treated, because that comes up time and time again

1 through this.
W€ill,

The fitex payment is really nothing
nothing doesn't do it justice.

It's

2

more —

3

important, but it's a vehicle to move from ordinary

4

income to nontaxable income salary.

5

It's not an insurance payment, and as a

6

result, I didn't trea t it as such.

7

like th at in my opinion shouldn't be.

8

Okay, debts an obligations.

9

MR. BARKER: Your Honor, you've given us no

10
11
12

credit for insurance, then?
THE COURT: No, I've given you the credit for
the actualL stuff denominated as insurance; $151.19 a

13 month, divided by —
14

well, with the child's section

taken out, for the total reimbursement of $439.69.

15

MR. BARKER: Thank you.

16

THE COURT: Yes.

17 contested item in —

Okay, let's see.

The next

truly contested item in expenses

18 were the unpaid medicals.
19

Cafeteria plans

I determined that I was

satisfied that the presence of the medicals on the

20 bankruptcy petition was satisfactory proof to me of
21

their legitimacy.

Accordingly I treated those as a

22 marital debt and split them.
23

The way I treated the personal property

24

subject to indebtedness, furniture, RC Willey, so

25

forth, is that I awarded that to Mr. Lovato, and

1

assigned to him the responsibility for payment.

2

what I did was take the rest of the personal property,

3

and left it to be divided one —

4

basis.

5

Then

on an alternating

If you don't like that —

and I would

6

imagine that nobody likes that —

7

welcome to stipulate to any kind of property, personal

8

property distribution that you choose.

9

you're certainly

I've also in paragraph 29 indicated that

10

the distribution shall occur at a time agreed upon by

11

the parties and shall be supervised by Counsel or

12

Counsel's designees.

13

keeping the peace, if nothing else.

14

I want somebody there who's

Real property is another troublesome area,

15

I guess.

Here's what I did and why I did it.

The

16

most contentious issue is insurance proceeds.

17

I determined was one, the insurance proceeds was a

18

marital debt —

19

because Mr. Lovato had unilateral control over that

20

property, that he had a concomitant obligation to

21

account for that, and that I was not satisfied with

22

the accounting that I received.

What

I mean, a marital property, and that

23

Therefore, what I did was reduce the amount

24

of insurance by the stipulated out-of-pocket payments

25

made by Mr. Lovato, divide the balance, and include

1

that in the equity of the home to be distributed

2

awarded to Ms. Lovato.

3

—

I'm looking for the paragraph that's going

4

to indicate what the —

5

award to respondent for her interest in the marital

6

home equity of $10,223, and unused insurance proceeds

7

of $7,456.79 total $17,679.79.

8

respondent's share of joint medical expenses, the net

9

property award is $15,399.79."

10

okay, paragraph 41.

"Total

When adjusted for

I decline the invitation to reduce this to a

11

judgment.

12

bear interest at the judgment rate.

13

petitioner's view that documentation of this should be

14

through warranty deed subject to the reservation of

15

the lien.

16

It will remain a lien, but it will however

Alimony.

I've adopted the

This is a very difficult issue,

17

and going to the bottom line I've determined that

18

an alimony award is appropriate here.

19

pivotal paragraph -- although it's a little prolix as

20

I read it over, and certainly could have been stated

21

more succinctly -- is found in paragraph 53, which I

22

note the petitioner's standard of living was higher

23

than the respondent's.

24

flexibility, even with the bankruptcy obligation, to

25

reduce expenses.

Probably the

I note that he has greater

Particularly the transportation

1
2

expenses.
It's my view that it's equitable to shift

3

to petitioner the responsibility for accommodating

4

respondent's need to obtain housing suitable to meet

5

her parenting responsibilities.

6

expense of Ms, Lovato that was most troubling to me

7

as being in my view totally out of line with what an

8

individual could be expected to pay for housing and

9

create a suitable environment for kids.

10

It was the housing

I note that although I've determined there

11

is insufficient factual basis to impute additional

12

income to Mr. Lovato based on his now defunct auto

13

body business, I hasten to note that I'm confident

V4
15
16
17
18
19

that he can generate income from this activity, even
on a hit and miss basis, which when coupled with the
reduction of his expenses is more likely than not to
make it possible for respondent to meet her legitimate
housing needs through alimony.
In other words, I credited the testimony

20

concerning state of Mr. Lovato's auto body business,

21

and declined to impute income, but I hedged that.

22

hedged it to the extent that I think that there is —

23

that Mr. Lovato is capable of generating in some way

24

auto body work on an ad hoc basis additional income,

25

because there is a track record sufficient when

I

1

coupled with adjustments and expenses to meet the $400

2

alimony payment.

3

Now, the $400 should come as no secret.

4

It comes from taking the $200 expense listed by

5

Ms. Lovato for housing, and adding $400 to reach

6

the $600 that I thought was reasonable for housing to

7

create an environment suitable to have those kids on

8

the scene.

9

So there it is.
I didn't net this out, I notice, but if you

10

do the netting, it comes out, I don't know, probably

11

Mr. Lovato's got to pay $40 a month or something.

12

Actually I can't remember how it comes out.

13

Ms. Lovato pays —

14

net obligation from Ms. Lovato to Mr. Lovato.

15

with insurance it's —

I think

so there's a

To the extent that these findings reflect

16

the reverse, as paragraph 58 reflects, I'll make note

17

of this.

I'm going to make a change in the final

18

edition.

I thought —

19

final edition, but it's obviously not.

20

I would hope this would be the

Tne pension plan business was m

my opinion

21

unremarkable.

I don't think that there's anything

22

remarkable about it.

23

Well, I guess it is remarkable m

24

will see that throughout I've adopted the date of

25

the separation as the operative date for virtually

I decline to touch the $600.

-8-

the sense that you

1
2

everything.
Paragraph 3, I've determined that the date

3

of separation, August 16, 1997 is a date which as a

4

practical matter ended parties' economic partnership

5

-- and we'll do a little correction there —

6

accordingly the valuation of property and obligation

7

shall be fixed to the extent possible as of that date.

and

8

So I may be a slave to consistency there,

9

but I've decided that that's the date and those are

10

the reasons.

11

Because part of the economic partnership between

12

the parties included retirement, that's when the

13

retirement is valued as well.

14

That's the reason why I did that.

Okay.

Then the final big ticket argument,

15

or potentially, are attorney's fees.

16

that there is a need, that Mr. Lovato is in a better

17

position to pay.

18

attorney's fee papers from Ms. Kelley.

19

I've determined

I've received some affidavit of

In seems appropriate that before I enter

20

any aware concerning amounts of attorney's fees,

21

that Mr. Barker be given an opportunity to challenge

22

reasonableness, and I'll leave that for another day.

23

I will entertain questions if you have questions.

24

Questions, but not debate.

25

things tc ^ou.

I'd be happy to explain

-9-

MS, KELLEY: On attorney's fees, your Honor,
at the trial we stipulated that each fee submitted at
the time of trial were reasonable.

Do you expect a

hearing on attorney's fees or —
THE COURT: I think that under — what's
the case —

In re: Quinn or Quinn versus Quinn or

something —

that a party should be afforded an

opportunity to challenge reasonableness if they want
to.
To be honest with you, it slipped my mind
that there had been a stipulation to that.

If it's a

done deal, as far as you're concerned, and if there is
a stipulation, maybe that ends the inquiry.
MR. BARKER: I think what we stipulated to
was that the services original for what we've done,
but we haven't stipulated the fees were necessary, and
there are various aspects of the case that were just
churning fees and really unnecessary.
THE COURT: Well, I would think there are
questions there of who was the churner and who was the
churnee, and I guess what I'd like to do is give you a
chance to nake your respective pitches to me on that
separately, because you know, it has the potential,
given the financial resources of these people, to be
a big deal.

Probably second only to the equity in

-10-

the house.

So I'm more comfortable giving you your

date in Court on that question than doing something
dramatic.
MS. KELLEY: So you anticipate a hearing
or Mr. Barker responding to my filings and having a
hearing?
THE COURT: Well, I think only if he wants
it.

I mean, your filings may be so compelling and

persuasive on the issue of reasonableness that we
don't need a hearing.

I mean, miracles do happen.

So we may not need one, and we might.
MS. KELLEY: Then just for clarification, it
looks like paragraph 17 calculates that child support
and insurance would be $439.69, which would result in
a net monthly payment to Mr. Lovato for about $40.
THE COURT: Right.

I think that's true, and

I'll try to clean up the paragraph that I didn't clean
up that suggests to the contrary back here someplace.
MR. BARKER: As a practical matter, your
Honor, if the judgment is entered against Mr. Lovato
for attorney fees, there's no way he can pay them, in
a lump sum, certainly, and we need to do something as
a practical matter or he will file another bankruptcy.
We don't want to have that happen.
resources are so strained now.

-11-

His

I v/ould suggest the

Court reconsider and that each party pay their own
attorney's fees.
herself.

She's got no one to care for except

He's got two kids to care for.
THE COURT: Well, one thing you might want to

give me a look at is whether I have within my power in
divorce cases the power to control the way fees are
paid, just as an example.

I mean, use your creative

minds here.
What you're hearing me say is I'm unlikely
to back off any of this, but I'm certainly amenable to
considering modifications on the margins.

So let me

say it again for point of reference.
The big ticket items here are cast in stone.
I've given this a lot of thought.

So I'm wetted to

the major issues, and they're done deals unless and
until they go to the fifth floor, but I'm certainly
willing to consider suggestions on the margins, on the
details.
Now, before we adjourn I just want to tell
you that I thought despite the clear and profound
misrepresentation that this was going to take a half
a day, that —

and here I'm talking to the parties —

that, you know, your lawyers did a good job here.
No question about it, and they laid out the issues
in great detail and were very persuasive about the
-12-

1

important points.

I'm always appreciative of that.

2

The work product that I received in the form of

3

proposed findings and conclusions were very helpful.

4

MS. KELLEY: Thank you, your Honor.

5

THE COURT: We're adjourned.

6 I (Hearing concluded)
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for
the State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That this proceeding was transcribed under
my direction from the transmitter records made of
these meetings.
That this transcript is full, true, correct,
and contains all of the evidence and all matters
to which the same related which were audible
through said recording.
I further certify that I am not interested
in the outcome thereof.
That certain parties were not identified in
the record, and therefore, the name associated
with the statement may not be the correct name as
to the speaker.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 30th day of
May 2000.
My commission expires:
February 24, 2004
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Beveriy Lowe
NOTARY PUBLIC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

EDWARD F. LOVATO,
Petitioner,
vs.

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO.

974904424

:

PETRA LOVATO#

:

Respondent.

:

Petitioner filed a Notice to Submit Motion for a New Trial or
to Correct Findings & Decree on December 28, 1999.

I have not

previously addressed this Notice to Submit because I intended my
Minute Entry of November 4, 1999 to address all issues raised in
the pleading entitled "Petitioner's Objections to Proposed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and to Divorce Decree."
I have taken this opportunity to review again the contents of
petitioner's

Motion

with

respect

to

what

petitioner

has

characterized as, incorrectly in my view, an offset of alimony
against child support.
his Motion is denied.

Petitioner's argument is unpersuasive and

LOVATO V. LOVATO

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE TWO

Respondent's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with
this Minute Entry.
Dated this

.day of March

RONAI^5E%*

DISTRI^
«7

y^^n^s/
^

LOVATO V. LOVATO
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MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this **? day of March,
2000:

Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Petitioner
2870 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Monica Z. Kelley
Attorney for Respondent
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Form BJ£ Continued
(9/97)
EXPLANATION OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
IN A CHAPTER 7 CASE
This court order grants a discharge to the person named as the debtor. It is not a dismissal of the case and
it does not determine how much money, if any, the trustee will pay to creditors.
Collection of Discharged Debts Prohibited
The discharge prohibits any attempt to collect from the debtor a debt that has been discharged. For
example, a creditor is not permitted to contact a debtor by mail, phone, or otherwise, to file or continue a lawsuit, to
attach wages or other property, or to take any other action to collect a discharged debt from the debtor. [In a case
involving community property:] [There are also special rules that protect certain community property owned by the
debtor's spouse, even if that spouse did not file a bankruptcy case.] A creditor who violates this order can be
required to pay damages and attorney's fees to the debtor.
However, a creditor may have the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest,
against the debtor's property after the bankruptcy, if that lien was not avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy case.
Also, a debtor may voluntarily pay any debt that has been discharged.
Debts That are Discharged
The chapter 7 discharge order eliminates a debtor's legal obligation to pay a debt that is discharged. Most,
but not all, types of debts are discharged if the debt existed on the date the bankruptcy case was filed. (If this case
was begun under a different chapter of the Bankruptcy Code and converted to chapter 7, the discharge applies to
debts owed when the bankruptcy case was converted.)
Debts That .are Not Discharged
Some of the common types of debts which are not discharged in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case are.
a. Debts for most taxes;
b. Debts that are in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support;
c. Debts for most student loans;
d. Debts for most fines, penalties, forfeitures, or criminal restitution obligations;
e. Debts for personal injuries or death caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while
intoxicated;
f. Some debts wiiich were not properly listed by the debtor;
g. Debts that the bankruptcy court specifically has decided or will decide in this bankruptcy case are not
discharged;
h. Debts for which the debtor has given up the discharge protections by signing a reaffirmation agreement
in compliance with the Bankruptcy Code requirements for reaffirmation of debts.
This information is only a general summary of the bankruptcy discharge. There are exceptions to
these general rules. Because the law is complicated, you may want to consult an attorney to determine the
exact effect of the discharge in this case.

